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Transitional Justice is a method to inject a sense of accountability and promote 
reconciliation in a post-conflict society laced with human rights abuses, war crimes, and 
poor governance structures. The methods consist of both judicial and non-judicial options 
meant to hold bad-actors accountable, unify divided factions, and work towards 
democratization. Building trust within the community and having the process viewed as 
legitimate is critical to the transition’s success. Without the affected populations 
supporting the process, it can have an adverse effect and deepen the divisions it is 
supposed to heal. This thesis shows how legitimacy is an integral process to transitional 
justice proceedings succeeding. The paper compares countries where its leaders have 
been indicted for crimes against humanity by either the United Nations or a criminal 
tribunal created to specifically deal with the alleged transgressions. It will outline the 
three main areas where legitimacy is most frequently undercut and how it deteriorates the 
process’s integrity. The three areas, trust between the local populations, the role of 
political elites, and the lack of social mobilization are discussed below.  
 The first chapter shows how political elites, both domestic and international, 
engineer transitional justice’s implementation to meet their own goals. As seen in Serbia, 
and Iraq, they co-opt revolutions and transitions; they manipulate the process for political 
gain and they ignore repercussions on the population. The second chapter demonstrates 
how different transitional justice methods are perceived among local populations and 
how choosing the right combination of methods to apply in each situation is challenging. 
Comparing transitional justice implementation in Uganda and Rwanda shows how both 
judicial and non-judicial methods presented pitfalls in the transition. Judicial measures 
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were challenging when determining who should be tried, if victims included soldiers 
fighting against their will, and if trials were exploited by the victors to punish their 
enemies. Finally, the paper demonstrates the importance of reaching out to affected 
populations to establish legitimacy during the transition. Those implementing transitional 
justice are unable to overcome their obstacles while conducting outreach and fail to 
research best-practices, make outreach a priority, and allocate adequate funding.  
Modeling best practices on global health campaigns operating under similar constraints 
provides a foundation for next steps. Realizing how poor outreach decimates a 
transition’s chance at success is an under prioritized but important component of any 
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Violent non-democratic regimes are frequently marred by decades of gross human 
rights violations and have institutionalized the worst governing practices.  Reversing 
these practices, building new, legitimate and lasting institutions, and helping a nation or 
region heal are among the main hurdles when these regimes are removed from power.  
Transitional justice represents a set of both judicial and non-judicial measures that 
countries can implement to help a population mend and rebuild governing institutions.   
My thesis shows how mistrust can be a major challenge while a country 
transitions between governments and I will examine three different areas that may lead to 
increased trust, participation and legitimacy from a country’s population. This transition 
is important because several experts suggest that transitional justice furthers 
democratization, helps populations heal in a post-conflict society, and can ease divisions 
between once warring societies. Additionally, transitions can occur in countries where 
U.S. and other armed forces are present and failings within the transition process leave 
soldiers and peacekeepers at risk. Furthermore, for countries where soldiers are not 
present, international governments (mainly from the West) outside of the affected conflict 
zone largely contribute to funding these transitional justice proceedings and therefore 
have an interest in seeing them performed well. 
  The first chapter shows how the political elite’s involvement affects the 
implementation of transitional justice measures.   The second chapter argues how 
different transitional justice measures employed in a transition can contribute to the 
population’s perception of legitimacy. Lastly, the third chapter shows how transitional 
justice’s implementers’ efforts to reach out to its population and inform them about 
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transition efforts, to encourage their participation, and make victims feel that perpetrators 
are held accountable leads to greater acceptance amongst the population.  
Improving transitional justice practices is critical for post-conflict societies and is 
of interest to the United States. Not only does the U.S. serve as a large contributor to the 
international organizations that tackle these transitions, but their own security interests 
require them to prevent further degradation in conflict-ridden societies.  
For example, as of 2014, conflict in Syria has left over three million Syrians 
displaced, hundreds of thousands killed, and spawned the creation of the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The conflict features strong sectarian overtones, accusations 
of war crimes, and a growing humanitarian crisis. The U.S. has provided over $3 billion 
in humanitarian aid alone since the conflict began. Additionally, the United States and 
dozens of other countries have launched a coalition against ISIL, putting U.S. soldiers at 
risk. When this region transitions into a post-conflict society, it will be in dire need of 
proper transitional justice proceedings to stave off further sectarian conflict and rebuild 
the region.  
This critical restructuring is nuanced and despite the myriad of options put forth 
by the international community and academic research, clear definitions for best practices 
in conducting transitional justice prove difficult to find. Current transitional justice 
practices lack the tools needed to build trust amongst the community, preventing the 
justice process from being viewed as legitimate. I argue that losing legitimacy is one of 
the biggest obstacles transitional justice must overcome. Democratization, good 




The first chapter demonstrates the difficulties in uniting fractured societies and 
multiple stakeholders, especially political elites, within a transitioning society.  The 
chapter argues that the elite’s interests play a large role in post-conflict societies. As such, 
they can act as puppeteers that incite political unrest, promote revolutions, and thereby 
influence the methods of transitional justice being applied. Examining U.S. actions in 
Iraq during de-Baathification and transition activities in Serbia after Yugoslavia split 
shows both domestic and international political elites manipulating the process for 
personal gain.   
In Iraq, U.S. officials disbanded the entire Iraqi military and civil service, leaving 
hundreds of thousands of people unemployed, angry at the U.S., and armed. In an effort 
to rid the government of members loyal to Saddam Hussein, the U.S. dismantled almost 
all public services including teachers and other administrative officials who joined the 
Baath party just to have access to employment. In Serbia, the new government reluctantly 
implemented transitional justice to gain recognition and financial aid from the West. 
They only committed to the bare minimum, underfunded the process, and never 
completed many of the objectives they stated. Furthermore, candidates seeking political 
office either supported or thwarted the process based on their allegiances to the West. 
Without any concern for domestic consequences, they performed the process poorly, 
politicized who they arrested to gain political points, and incited ethnic tensions to win 
elections. 
In both cases, domestic and political elites overtook the transition to further their 
own political agenda for financial and political gain. They failed to take into 
consideration the impact their decisions would have on the transition. Both instances bred 
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mistrust amongst the community and further inflamed ethnic tensions that the transition 
was meant to quell.  
In the second chapter, I argue that transitional justice being viewed as legitimate 
is critical to ensuring its success. Deciding who, how, and where proceedings are 
conducted sets the foundation for a strong transition. Since establishing legitimacy is a 
main component to the transition, ensuring the process is conducted by people the 
community trust is a major factor.  Neglecting to do so hinders the process and breeds 
mistrust. Failing to incorporate the potential for mistrust when deciding who conducts 
transitional justice is a major crack in the transition’s foundation. To demonstrate the 
significance, I use a comparative case study of Uganda and Rwanda, showing issues with 
both judicial and non-judicial options, and emphasizing the importance on deciding who 
will carry out the methods of transitional justice.  
Violence in Uganda spanned several years, became divided along tribal lines, and 
devolved from a counterinsurgency against the Ugandan government into an ethnic 
conflict. The rapid and indiscriminant nature of Rwanda’s genocide produced an 
immediate need for justice and reconciliation between tribal groups but both judicial and 
non-judicial options were problematic.  Examining transitional justice efforts in regards 
to the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda and Rwanda’s genocide show how post-
conflict divisions serve as an obstacle to a successful transition. 
The final chapter shows how transitional justice practitioners fail to increase 
participation in the process. Referred to as outreach, it is how a country engages with its 
citizens in regards to implementation.  A variety of tools can be used including the media, 
distributing information, or grassroots mobilization to enhance legitimacy and increase 
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participation. The third chapter hypothesizes that increased outreach efforts yields 
increased levels of participation and better perception during transitional justice 
proceedings.  
When the population perceives transitional justice mechanisms being used as 
illegitimate they are less willing to participate. Activities to increase their participation 
can translate into a more successful transition.  While outreach has been designed 
specifically to motivate participation, it is a largely ignored mechanism. The hurdles 
outreach programs face overwhelm the implementers and lead to little or no outreach 
being conducted. Outreach is under prioritized, underfunded, and underutilized. The lack 
of literature and research on the subject prompts the paper to examine global health 
campaigns to show how valuable effective outreach can be. Since global health 
campaigns operate in many of the same conditions as transitional justice implementers, 
comparing their methods is a useful tool.  Better understanding the potential of outreach 
efforts along with examples of best practices taken from global health campaigns can 
help determine if increased funding levels for that purpose would be helpful in the overall 
process.  
This thesis demonstrates the importance of transitional justice and shows how the 
process is delegitimized.  It argues theories on best practices are inconclusive and 
methods are under-researched. First, I show how political elites are truly the puppeteers 
of transitional justice and greatly diminish legitimacy to serve their own purposes. Then, 
I argue current practices are not sufficient in deciding which methods, judicial or non-
judicial, are best-suited for particular situations to increase legitimacy. Lastly, I show 
how outreach and social mobilization campaigns are consistently underutilized during the 
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transition, leaving local populations misinformed, unaware of proceedings, and 
























Chapter 1: Political Elites: The Puppeteers of Transitional Justice 
INTRODUCTION 
When non-democratic regimes that commit gross human rights violations 
disregard international law and poor governing practices are overthrown, a critical 
transition must take place. These regimes carried out human rights violations over 
decades and have institutionalized the worst governing practices.  Reversing these 
practices, building new, legitimate and lasting institutions, and helping a nation or region 
heal are among the country’s main hurdles. To tackle the work ahead, countries can 
implement transitional justice, a set of both judicial and non-judicial measures, to help a 
population heal and rebuild governing institutions.   The tools available for transitional 
justice can be judicial—International Criminal Court (ICC), ad hoc tribunals, or a hybrid 
of the two—or non-judicial—Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC), victim 
compensation, non-criminal sanctions, amnesties, or a concept of forgetting atrocities to 
move forward. 1 Regardless of the method chosen, the tools are meant to either punish or 
pardon the perpetrators, with the hope of balancing reconciliation with retribution. 
Transitional justice tools can be instrumental after a violent regime is overthrown, 
when political stability is absent, and the state’s judiciary, military, and civil societies are 
in flux. Additionally, a transition usually features several actors. These can include the 
recently ousted political leaders who are hoping to avoid prosecution, factions fighting to 
take control of the new government, the general public, and various international actors; 
all of whom can have agendas ranging from upholding international law to influencing 
                                                     
1For a further breakdown of these methods, please review Neil Kritz,”Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A 
Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights,” Law & Contemporary 
Problems 59 no.4 (1996): 127-152. 
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budding institutions. Despite the extensive options available, reconciling competing 
stakeholder’s motives to establish governmental stability is still difficult.  
The downward spiral of failed policies mimics the warnings Dietrich Dörner 
references in The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex 
Situations. This break down is an important tool that can be applied to transitional justice 
proceedings to see where the political elites made mistakes and derailed the reconciliation 
process.  Dörner’s decision-making trends that led to failure were:  
[1] acted without prior analysis of the situation, [2] failed to anticipate side effects 
and long-term repercussions, [3] assumed that the absence of immediately 
obvious negative effects meant that correct measures had been taken, [4] let over-
involvement in “projects” blind them to emerging needs and changes in the 
situation [5] were prone to cynical reactions.2 
 
Political elites are “persons whose strategic positions in large and powerful 
organization and movements enable them to influence political decision-making directly, 
substantially, and regularly.”3Current transitional justice focuses on healing and 
reconciling the population and enforcing international law. Stability is often best 
achieved by understanding the prominent players’ (political elites) motives and working 
to reconcile their concerns.  This helps ensure all stakeholders work together in 
rebuilding their government.  
 International organizations, governments, civic organizations, and security forces 
can all benefit from a better understanding of political elites’ goals and how they might 
interfere with transitions. Failed transitions can breed dysfunction and destabilize the 
security, economic and political apparatus in both the transitioning state and its 
                                                     
2 Dietrich Dörner, The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex Situations. 
Translated by Rita Kimber and Robert Kimber (New York: Basic Books 1996, 18. 
3 John Higley and Gwen Moore, “Political Elite Studies at the Year 2000” International Review of 
Sociology 11 (2001): 176.  
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neighbors. For a country that has spent decades enduring extrajudicial killings, abuse, 
kidnappings and torture, and justice, redemption by the repressed will be a top demand.4  
 How to forge trust between divided communities and multiple stakeholders, 
especially political elites, within a transitioning society is still largely unresolved within 
transitional justice literature. In the following sections, I show how political elites factor 
into transitioning states.  I argue that the elite’s interests often play a large role in a 
transition, and can act as puppeteers that incite political unrest, promote revolutions and 
thereby prompt forms of transitional justice to be applied. Citing examples from Croatia, 
Serbia, Iraq, and Egypt, I explain how political elites can alter the transition’s course. 
Lastly, using the de-Baathification in Iraq, I illustrate the national security concerns 
posed for both the civilian and security populations when process goes awry.   
Political Elites and Uprisings 
Regime change can come about in different ways. Countries primed for regime 
change may have populations that peacefully demand change, freedom from oppression, 
equal treatment, and a voice in government. Regime change may also occur as the result 
of mass demonstrations, rallies, and even armed conflicts.  World leaders frequently tout 
these “popular” uprisings as a call for democracy. For example, in a statement on January 
14, 2011, President Obama called the uprisings in Tunisia a, “brave and determined 
struggle for the universal rights that we must all uphold.”5 
 Literature also suggests that elites often act as puppeteers to ignite the masses and 
prompt regime changes to benefit their own interests. The following section uses the 
                                                     
4 Neil Kritz,”Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass 
Violations of Human Rights,” Law & Contemporary Problems 59 no.4 (1996): 127. 
5 U.S. President (Obama), “Statement by the President on the Events in Tunisia,” press release, January 14, 
2011, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/14/statement-president-events-tunisia. 
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literature to show how political elites can play influential roles in political uprisings and 
are invested in the uprising’s outcome. Specifically, political elites are interested in who 
comes to power once an uprising is over and how those formerly in power will be held 
accountable. The literature points out the elite’s involvement in the outcome which helps 
the paper show why they would have an interest in inserting themselves into potential 
transitional justice proceedings. 
While protestors genuinely ask for justice, democracy, and truth, the elites may be 
exploiting their grievances. The unhappy populace may be nudged by elites looking to 
legitimize the rebellion and garner popular support.  End-results, such as over-thrown 
governments, may secure the elites’ goals for political, economic and security control. 
Paul Collier explores the connection between a population’s grievances and civil conflict 
in the world’s poorest countries, and finds business interests or commodity control drive 
rebellion more frequent than repression or income inequality.6 He suggests that rebel 
motivations are often times as dubious as the oppressors.7 Research also shows that 
economic stagnation and decline combined with a nation’s access to commodities, such 
as diamonds and oil, increase chances for conflicts and rebellions pushing for regime 
change.8 Collier cites diamond mines and control of natural resources as ulterior motives 
for conflicts in Sierra Leone, Zaire and the Republic of Congo.9 Furthermore, research 
shows that rebels in search of economic and political control exploit or even fabricate 
                                                     
6 Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about it 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 19. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 21. 
9 Ibid., 25-29. 
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grievances, whereas the populations that are actually marginalized are too impoverished 
and destitute to rise up.10  
 A similar tale unfolded in Egypt, where political and military elites are competing 
for control amid uprisings, elections and political unrest. Mubarak reigned over Egypt for 
decades suppressing freedom of press, religion and assembly. Mubarak’s government 
built up a strong military, discouraged civil society from flourishing, and prevented any 
unbiased judiciary from taking hold. In 2011, Egyptians took to the streets calling for his 
resignation and end to his dictatorial role. Astonishingly, the military refused to aid 
Mubarak in his efforts to quiet down protestors. The military’s unwillingness to get 
involved received international praise, and Mubarak was soon overthrown.11 Some 
literature contradicts the suggestion that the Egyptian political system was brought down 
by unrelenting pressure of the masses.  Contrary to calls for democracy being the reason 
for Mubarak’s downfall, some literature suggests the uprising was actually born out of 
political elites fighting over who would succeed Mubarak.12   
Prior to the revolution, Hosni Mubarak was promoting his son Gamal as his 
potential successor. This worried the military and ruling elite, because Gamal’s 
background was very different from previous Egyptian leaders. After Egypt’s monarchy 
was overthrown in the 1950s, the Egyptian leaders strong-armed their way to the top with 
assassinations, overthrows and the military’s backing. Leaders came in only after military 
approval and demonstrated support of the protectionist economic policies that were in 
                                                     
10 Ibid., 24. 
11 Ewan Stein, “Revolution Or coup? Egypt’s Fraught Transition” Survival 54 (2012): 45-46. 
12 Ibid.: Gumer Isaev. “Russia and Egypt: Conflicts in the political elite and protest movements in 2011–
2012,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014): 60-62. 
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place and would continue to benefit the ruling elite.13 Gamal’s lack of military 
experience, combined with his support for liberal economic policies, went against 
tradition.14 The military failed to intervene and quell protests in Tahrir Square, seeing an 
opening to disrupt Mubarak’s family succession and appoint someone from their own 
guard in the process.15 Predictably, in March of 2014, Egypt’s top military leader, 
General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, once heralded as a champion for the people, announced his 
intention to run for president of Egypt. Simultaneously in March, Egyptian courts 
sentenced over 600 people to death for supporting the recently deposed Mohammed 
Morsi.16  
Political Elites and Transitions 
Aside from monopolizing on conditions to incite rebellion, political elites also 
play a role in transitions, jockeying for power as new institutions and norms are 
established.  Some elites from former regimes may attempt to maintain power and their 
own safety. Others, likely central to the rebellion, maybe ready to become the new elite 
and take control of the power structures they sought to overturn. Critical goals of the 
transition are to quell fears of retribution against the former elite, incorporate the new 




                                                     
13 Isaev, “Russia and Egypt,” 61-64. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Stein, “Revolution Or coup?” 45-46. 
16 "Amnesty International," Amnesty International. April 28, 2014. http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/egypt-
unfair-trial-death-sentences-make-mockery-justice-2014-04-28 (accessed April 26, 2014). 
17 Robert Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfield. “Federal Institutions and the Democratic Transition: Learning 




As mentioned before, political elites strive to stay in power to control precious 
resources and commodities.18  They can use these resources to cement their financial 
standing, and also use control of precious resources to either gain political support among 
some factions, while withholding those resources and marginalizing others.19 The 
literature calls this “elite capture.” Elite capture can include using “public goods for 
private gain; community resource theft; falsifying financial accounts...biased section of 
beneficiaries [and] exclusion of specific community members or groups from receiving 
benefits or social goods.”20  While repressive regimes often have similar characteristics, 
scholars purport elite capture occurs when influential people participating in the peace 
building process misuse their power to their advantage. To mitigate elite capture, those 
implementing the transition can either exclude the elites, known as “counter elite 
approach” or try and find the elites who can be persuaded to use their power for good, 
labeled the “co-opt elite approach.”21 
Intra-Elite Conflict 
Literature regarding political elites in transitions also outlines intra-elite conflict, 
which can devolve into intra-elite violence. Intra-elite conflict takes many forms.  
Factions mobilize against their competitors and vie for control of powerful resources. 
This power-struggle can occur by organizing protests against their competitors or through 
patronage for contractors and businesses they favor.22 The conflict can also escalate into 
                                                     
18 Collier, the Bottom Billion, 24-25. 
19 Melissa T. Labonte, “From Patronage to Peacebuilding? Elite Capture and Governance from below in 
Sierra Leone” African Affairs 111, no. 442 (2012): 93. 
20 Labonte, “From Patronage to Peacebuilding,” 95-96. 
21 Ibid., 104-105. 
22 Karl van Holdt, “South Africa: The Transition to Violent Democracy” Review of African Political 
Economy 40 (2013): 598-600. 
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intra-elite violence, where members resort to eliminating their opposition through 
assassinations, violence, intimidation, and mobilizing activists to become violent.23  
These conflicts can subside if stable elite coalitions are brokered and factions feel they 
have effective non-violent avenues to impact change.24 
International Political Elites 
Academics also spend time examining the role international political elites play in 
transitional justice’s implementation. As conducting transitional justice becomes more 
commonplace in post-conflict society, the United Nations (UN) has become increasingly 
active.25 The UN has been involved in several stages of the justice process. It assists in 
constitution-drafting, judicial proceedings, setting up reconciliation commissions and 
outlining victim reparation programs. In several cases, it will also either train or provide 
its own judges, lawyers, and clerks to supplement in-country efforts.26 The other way 
international elites can get involved is via conditionality. Explored further in the Serbia 
case study, conditionality is when international actors tie assistance, loans, international 
acceptance, and foreign policy decisions to a post-conflict state with their willingness to 
engage in transitional justice practices; most frequently, in regards to arrests, criminal 
tribunals, and extraditions to the Hague.27  
 
 
                                                     
23 Ibid., 599-600. 
24 Ibid., 602; John Higley and Michael G. Burton, “The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and 
Breakdowns [1989] Historical Social Research 37 (2012): 251. 
25 Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, “Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom 
up,” Journal of Law & Society 35 (2009): 270-271. 
26 Ibid., 274. 
27 Marlene Spoerri, “Justice Imposed: How Policies of Conditionality Effect Transitional Justice in the 




Elites and their competing interests 
The literature shows that ulterior motives and power grabs, not oppression, are a 
major cause of regime change. Competing interests of political elites can derail the 
transition process and put both civilians and soldiers at risk. Understanding the 
competing factions and their motives can lay the foundation for the challenges on the 
road to stability. It can help provide models for what to expect in future transitions and 
enable us to predict the obstacles en route to democracy. Only after a nation has 
stabilized, and risk for devolution into more violence is minimized can legitimate 
governing institutions take root. Neutralizing elite factions can calm hostilities and enable 
political elites to make productive decisions that bring civil rest to their society.  
METHODOLOGY 
A comparative case study of Serbia and Iraq effectively illustrates how both 
domestic and international political elites can co-opt transitional justice procedures and 
disregard the need for reconciliation among victims. Comparing these two countries 
shows the importance of focusing transitional justice policies on affected populations to 
foster trust amongst the community. 
 Serbia and Iraq were chosen because both countries experienced conflicts in 
where their leaders were tried for crimes against humanity. Furthermore, both countries 
have well-documented instances of political elites dictating policies that created mistrust 
and fueled sectarian angst that transitional justice implementation works to counter. The 
case studies trace how transitional justice proceedings in Serbia and Iraq furthered 




 Years of conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the eventual independence of 
Serbia came at the expense of thousands massacred, including young children, with 
disregard for ethnic lines. The U.S. led invasion of Iraq ousted its brutal dictator Saddam 
Hussein. The West’s efforts to promote democratization and repair Iraq’s civil and 
military institutions by removing perceived political bad actors left people feeling 
unjustly victimized and unemployed with easy access to arms. Examining transitional 
justice efforts in both Serbia and Iraq shows how post-conflict reforms can quickly 
become dominated by political elites, leaving those most in need of reconciliation as an 
afterthought.  
Serbia  
 In the 1990s, as Yugoslavia began to split, the region spiraled into violent ethnic-
driven conflict led by Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic. Constant shelling, bombings, 
and brutal murders by Milosevic’s soldiers forced people underground and into shelters. 
When they emerged, they recounted sites of corpses of both adults and children 
indiscriminately strewn about after being dismembered mercilessly.28 Serbs were also 
rounded up, interned in camps, summarily executed, and disposed of in mass graves.29  
Upon Serbia’s creation, the new government reluctantly implemented transitional 
justice policies to deal with atrocities such as the massacre in Srebrenica that left 7,000 
young boys and men dead.30 Competing goals from elites in the international community 
and the new governments resulted in a diluted process focused on placating power-
                                                     
28 Janin Natalya Clark, "The ICTY and Reconciliation in Croatia." Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 10 (2012): 401. 
29 Clark, “The ICTY and Reconciliation in Croatia,” 402.  
30 Jelena Subotic, “The Paradox of International Justice Compliance,” International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 3 (2009): 367. 
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players instead of reconciling the population.31 In this case, emerging leaders faced 
pressures from the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) to extradite 
Slobodan Milosevic and other accused war criminals to stand trial.  However, the 
population did not believe that exporting the process to the ICTY would deliver results, 
nor were they confident the ICTY could provide catharsis by holding protracted trials for 
only a few high-ranking individuals.32 Since Serbia was undergoing transition, the 
international community leveraged aid and assistance in return for compliance to its 
preferred transitional tools.33   
 After Milosevic fell from power, a nationalist president, Vojislav Kostunica, and 
democratic-leaning prime minister, Zoran Djindjic, were sworn into office.34 The West 
pushed the new leaders to support transitional justice policies immediately. 
Unfortunately, much of the Serbian population did not want their government to hand 
former leaders over to the ICTY and furthermore, Djindjic and Kostunica disagreed on 
how to move forward.  
Only 11% of Serbs supported the transfer of Milosevic to The Hague. However, 
the United States and the European Union (EU) tied much-needed aid and loan packages 
to Serbia complying with international standards and turning over Milosevic.35 This 
policy, known as conditionality, pushed Serbian leadership to balance the desire between 
staying in office with the need for procuring international assistance and Western 
support, including a pathway into the EU. Kostunica, opposed to the idea of international 
compliance, refused to cooperate despite international threats to cut off aid. He also 
                                                     
31 Brian Grodsky, “International Prosecutions and Domestic Politics: The Use of Truth Commissions as 
Compromise Justice in Serbia and Croatia,” International Studies Review 11 (2009): 687. 
32 Grodsky, “International Prosecutions,” 690. 
33 Ibid., 700. 
34 Subotic, “The Paradox,” 368. 
35 Grodsky, “International Prosecutions,” 696. 
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offered local alternatives for undertaking justice such as domestic trials and truth and 
reconciliation commissions.36  
His decisions to ignore the West and implement his own methods of transitional 
justice were largely ineffective. First, Prime Minister Djindjic, prioritizing EU acceptance 
and aid, arranged for Milosevic to be arrested behind President Kostunica’s back.37 Soon 
after, Serbia’s paramilitary forces assassinated Dkindjic, leaving a power vacuum to be 
filled with radical and nationalists that ignored international indictments and funded the 
accused criminals’ defense before the ICTY.38  The ICTY applied pressure once again, 
this time indicting military officials that served in the Serbian government.39 In response, 
Kostunica turned over three generals under the policy of “voluntary surrenders.” 
Subsequently, the generals received significant domestic support and were labeled as 
patriots whose sacrifices served the good of their country. Additionally, Kostunica 
avoided having to explain the generals’ crimes.40  
Kostunica’s local justice efforts were thinly veiled attempts at alleviating 
international pressure without accomplishing any reconciliation. The reconciliation 
commission was hastily created with poor funding, no international consultation, and was 
authorized to gather its information solely from open-source material. Additionally, the 
commission was primarily staffed by Serbian nationalists who were given no clear 
guidelines, and had no authority to interview the civilian or military populations.41 
Several local leaders later stated on the record that the commission was an international 
                                                     
36 Ibid. 
37 Subotic, “The Paradox,” 369. 
38 Ibid., 370. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Subotic, “The Paradox,” 371. 
41 Grodsky, “International Prosecutions,” 697. 
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ploy that lacked real substance. In the end, it failed to publish any findings and its website 
eventually turned into a pornography site.42  
Iraq  
After the United States invaded Iraq, it quickly wanted to employ a process akin 
to de-Nazification in an effort to purge the civic and security institutions of the Baath 
Party, the party of Saddam Hussein.  Originating in Syria, Baathism “is a secular Arab 
nationalist political ideology... is vague and heavily nationalistic.”43 The Baath Party was 
set up to rely on secretive and personal relationships with membership only being 
reserved for a small group of people.  After Hussein’s ascension to power, he relaxed the 
registration process to increase membership and include all sectors of military and 
civilian institutions.44 This made the Baath Party the ruling party in Iraq.  The exact 
structure of the Baath Party is still murky because of its secretive nature. Saddam’s 
tendency to control the country through propaganda, education, and security forces 
ensured that Baath Party members ran most of the civic and security institutions.  At the 
time of Hussein’s fall, some estimates show party membership was around 2 million 
people.45 
 After the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the U.S. implemented a policy of de-
Baathification to prevent the party and its elites from returning to power, and preventing 
successful democratization. In May 2013, the U.S. Department of Defense recruited 
former ambassador L. Paul Bremer to spearhead de-Baathification efforts via the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).  CPA was the temporary government set up by 
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the U.S. and its coalition forces to shepherd Iraq through its transition from Saddam 
Hussein’s rule to a more democratic structure. The CPA dismissed members from civil 
services based on their rank within the party, assuming that more senior members were 
ideologically tied to party ideals and more likely to have committed atrocities.46 While 
the original policy was to dismiss the top two levels of civil society, Bremer decided the 
top four levels of the Iraqi government and ministries were “true believers” and expanded 
the policies. This expansion led to 85,000 civilians losing their jobs, including 40,000 
teachers who joined the Baath Party solely to gain employment.47 
The decision was additionally made to completely disband all military and 
security forces, which took the estimated number of soldiers impacted from 25,000 to 
400,000.48 Disbanding the military left thousands of young men with access to weapons, 
unemployed, and stripped of their prestigious social standing. Many critics argue this 
complete disarmament greatly influenced the bloody insurgency that took place from 
2004-2008, claiming lives of Iraqis and Americans.49 In civil society, teachers, 
administrators, judicial, provincial and state employees were all let go of and banned 
from participating in the future government positions. Schools stopped working, civil 
institutions ceased to exist and students were unable to receive an education or graduate 
on time.50  These purges were done without individual criteria or investigations into past 
actions.  The decision was based on rank in the party and led to sweeping layoffs that 
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disproportionately impacted the Sunni minority who already feared retribution from the 
Shiite majority in a post-Hussein Iraq.51   
ANALYSIS 
Comparing the two cases to existing literature on transitional justice policies 
confirms predictions that elites can control and capture the process for their own benefit. 
Additionally, analyzing events in Iraq and Serbia against Dörner’s trends on failure shed 
light on where things went wrong. Examining the failed de-Baathification process sheds 
light on the decision making process by international political elites, in this case, the U.S. 
national security and defense advisors.  In Serbia, the transition was somewhat successful 
because of the ICC’s ability to prosecute bad actors and Serbia’s free and fair elections. 
However, the new government largely ignored reconciliation efforts due to friction 
between domestic and international political elites. Both cases exhibited many of 
Dörner’s signs regarding poor decision-making and ineffective policies, and were driven 
by the motives of political elites.  
In Iraq, Bremer acted without prior understanding of the situation. He lacked 
appropriate relevant work experience. He “had no background in the Middle East, did not 
know Arabic, had never been in the military, and had never run a large organization.”52 
Not speaking the local language and failing to understand the complexities of U.S. - 
Middle East relations, specifically with Iraq, was detrimental.  
Bremer’s decision to completely dissolve Iraqi security forces was made without 
adequate consultation with his superiors in Washington, D.C., thus prohibiting him from 
seeing the ripple effects the actions would cause. His decision led to larges masses of 
unemployed men who could readily access arms.  They were stripped of their respectable 
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positions and presumed guilty without individual investigations.53 Moreover, the readings 
indicate Bremer failed to consider other less-extreme options, such as removing loyal 
Baathists while reinstating less radicalized soldiers into the new security apparatus.54 
Furthermore, it took time for the insurgency to take hold and its lack of immediate 
appearance allowed U.S. forces to think this policy was successful. This delay in 
consequences led Bremer to believe he was on the right track, further encouraging him to 
continue down the same path without re-examining the policies’ effectiveness.   
Additionally, the fear of Baathist’s coming back into power clouded decision-
makers’ judgments.  They were fixated on delegitimizing the Baath Party rather than 
reconciliation or rebuilding strong governing institutions. Bremer became focused on 
delegitimizing the Baath Party and tied a successful transition to their dismantling. As a 
result, he was unable to have a holistic view of the different dynamics in Iraqi politics; 
especially the impact religious tensions have on reconciliation efforts.  
Lastly, reports frequently noted Bremer’s lackluster attitude in dealing with the 
Iraqi people.  Instead of cultivating relationships with future Iraqi leaders, Bremer 
scoffed, assumed their incompetence, and treated them as a hurdle to surpass to 
implement his agenda. Insulting the Iraqi population garnered more mistrust between the 
U.S. and Iraq at a time when the U.S. needed to exert itself as a central player in Iraq’s 
reconstruction in order to accomplish its policy objectives.    
In Iraq, international political elites wanted to prevent a violent regime from 
regaining power and instill the beginnings of a new democracy. Unfortunately, their 
strong-armed tactics fueled ethnic conflict, raised unemployment, and ignored the 
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importance of reconciliation between Sunnis and Shia Muslims. Instead of working with 
domestic and international civil societies to foster trust between divided communities, 
top-down regulations from political elites co-opted useful transitional justice policies and 
enabled tribal and ethnic divisions to overpower good governing practices.   
 In Serbia, at least three of Dörner’s five indicators were clearly present. While 
international elites understood the importance of transitional justice, they misjudged 
long-term consequences of their actions on reconciliation. Due to their success with 
capturing bad actors and subsequent trials, international elites felt they were on the right 
track.   
Both international and domestic political elites over-looked the long-term effects 
their policies would have on reconciliation efforts within the former Yugoslavia. The 
domestic political infighting caused domestic turmoil and hindered cooperation with the 
ICC. The most notable failing in Serbia was both the international and domestic elites’ 
over-emphasis on short-term objectives. Unable to assess ripple effects of their actions, 
political elites detracted from their end-goals of legitimate governance and accountability 
within Serbia’s new government. Putting re-election efforts ahead of reconciliation, 
domestic elites conducted sham fact-finding missions and treated truth and reconciliation 
commissions as a political tool instead of a vital part of implementing transitional justice. 
Internationally, success was closely tied to retribution and ignored reconciliation efforts. 
Internally, political parties focused wholly on acceptance by either domestic or 
international elites and were unable to balance the two.  
The conflicting goals of both domestic and international political elites soiled the 
ICTY’s attempt to promote transitional justice proceedings and reconciliation. Looking 
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solely at the empirics, the data seems impressive but can be misleading. Slated to end its 
work in 2014, the ICTY boasts 161 indictments, 64 arrests and 47 surrenders.55 Though 
the top military officials were captured and many convicted, the numbers do not properly 
represent the ICTY’s successes. While the main goal of accountability may have been 
achieved, the supplemental and equally important goals of reconciliation and truth 
seeking were left ignored. Studies have been conducted both on a national and local level 
in Serbian regions where heavy fighting occurred, and showed that people continue to 
suffer from mistrust in their government, mistrust in their neighbors, and a mistrust of 
what really happened during the conflict in the 1990s.56  
CONCLUSION 
Transitional justice proceedings may be complicated, expensive, and require 
outside counsel. Countries and other interested stakeholders such as international 
organizations, human rights groups, security forces, and peace keeping groups all need to 
remain vigilant of domestic and international elites hindering the process. As seen in Iraq, 
international political elites can unintentionally thwart the process by prioritizing holding 
bad-actors accountable while failing to soothe ethnic tensions and promote reconciliation. 
As showcased in Serbia, domestic elites can manipulate proceedings to bolster ratings 
with their domestic constituencies while courting the international community in 
exchange for aid and influence. New elites can be hesitant to defer to international 
tribunals conducted at The Hague when establishing their own legitimacy.  The potential 
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exists of provoking rebellion from the outgoing-elite and appearing weak and unable to 
consolidate power themselves57.  
Regime change in a post-conflict state creates a window of opportunity for 
transitional justice policies to be implemented. With hopes of reconciling a divided, 
grieving, and wounded citizenry, the tools of transitional justice can lay the foundation 
for better governing practices. The combination of judicial and non-judicial options can 
help foster trust by holding perpetrators accountable and shedding light on the brutal 
tactics violent regimes frequently suppress during their reign. Carefully choosing which 
methods to employ and continuously monitoring their progress is necessary to ensure 
proceedings remain objective is an important way to foster reconciliation, soothe inter-
country tensions, and promote good governing practices.. This constant vigilance can 
help ensure the proceedings benefit the population and do not become politicized actions 
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CHAPTER 2: Transitional Justice: Several Options, No Solutions 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper demonstrates the importance of choosing transitional justice methods 
that are viewed as legitimate and how the absence of which has consequences for years 
after a conflict has been resolved. The literature looks to be a conglomerate of different 
experts, academics or researchers who are writing based on their own experiences, 
research, or expertise in a particular country or region.  I find that current writings present 
an amalgam of options, past experiences, and potential solutions. Unfortunately they lack 
a resounding theory or reliable solutions with consistently successful outcomes.  
Governments, international organizations, human rights groups, security forces and 
peace keeping groups all have a vested interest in defining successful models for 
transitional justice.  Effective implementation of transitional justice carries untold 
consequences for the regional, security, and economic development in the nations 
undergoing regime-change.  With several changes underway post-Arab Spring, justice 
will be one of the top demands for millions of people who have been subjected to 
extrajudicial killings, abuse, kidnappings and torture for decades under ruthless despots 
in countries such as Egypt and Syria.58   
The Egyptian people’s overthrow of Hosni Mubarak and their revolt against former 
President Morsi (who was deposed early into this first term) shows how years of 
oppression led the population to demand justice.  Mubarak’s regime was marred with 
kidnapping, torture, and extrajudicial killing.  Reports tell stories of men being kidnapped 
and not returning, and if they did return, they bore signs of torture as a result of opposing 
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the regime.59 Despite the nondemocratic regime being overthrown and Arab Spring 
protestors calling for more personal liberties, there were reports of disappearances being 
carried out by the military.60  
 In Syria’s case, if/when President Bashar Al-Assad is overthrown the transition may 
be two-fold. The country will first grapple with the brute force of Assad, and then with 
the merciless killings their recent revolution digressed into.  What many thought was 
another revolution has devolved into a violent war showing signs of ethnic divisions with 
reports of Sarin gas usage from both sides of the conflict.61 As of December 2014, both of 
these cases are still unfolding and already showing how transitional justice could be a 
necessity for both countries.  
The following sections outline transitional justice’s methods and show that one of 
the things the literature does agree on is that transitional justice efforts must be viewed as 
legitimate to yield the best results. The methods governments apply directly correlates 
with the population’s perception of what is most legitimate. However, forging trust 
between divided communities and the several stakeholders within a transitioning society 
still seems to be a largely unresolved issue in the readings. After explaining the tools 
available, this paper will use the cases of both Uganda and Rwanda to exemplify 
obstacles in implementing transitional justice in a way that maximizes legitimacy and 
participation.  This paper analyzes conflicts in both of these countries to demonstrate the 
importance of choosing transitional justice methods that are viewed as legitimate and 
how the absence of which has consequences for years after a conflict has been resolved.  
                                                     
59 David Keyes, “Hosni Mubarak’s Human-Rights Horros,” The Daily Beast, February 6, 2011. 
60 Liam Stack, “Egypt’s Missing, Tales of Torture and Prison,” The New York Times, Freburary 17, 2011. 





Tools of Transitional Justice 
Despite a lack of clarity on best practices in transitional justice, authors suggest 
that the more effective the implementation of transitional justice, the smoother and 
stronger the shift to democracy.62 This assumption stems from both practical experience 
and mental health studies. According to Oscar Encarnación, international legal scholars 
strongly believe transition periods for administering justice are an essential way to deal 
with post-conflict countries.63 He cites the Nuremberg trials after World War II that 
resulted in the conviction of several high-ranking Nazi officials coupled with Germany’s 
transition towards democracy as a major contributing factor.64 Neil Kritz, one of the 
resounding voices in international law and post-conflict situations, suggests conducting 
transitional justice is also steeped in the human psychology findings that utilizing 
mechanisms promoting closure after experiencing trauma are a key element to sound 
mental health and stability.65 The tools available in the case of transitional justice are 
meant to either punish or pardon the perpetrators with the hope of balancing 
reconciliation with retribution.  The judicial options are the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), ad-hoc tribunals or a hybrid of the two. The non-judicial options can be Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions (TRC), victim compensation, non-criminal sanctions, 
amnesties or a concept of forgetting atrocities to move forward.  
Judicial Options 
States can utilize the judiciary and hold trials for those who committed the 
atrocities. Trials can be useful for holding criminals accountable and send a warning to 
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future perpetrators that their actions will not go unpunished. They may also provide a 
sense of justice and catharsis by providing formal institutions where grievances are 
addressed and justice is served. Writings by both sociologists and conflict-management 
specialists say trials prevent collective guilt or anger towards large groups of people such 
as ethnicities or religious groups by labeling specific individuals as the ones 
responsible.66 Luc Huyse, a sociologist specializing in group behavior as a result of 
inequity or inclusion writes that prosecutions also administer justice and can prevent 
victims from feeling ignored or wronged, which can lead to vigilante justice and further 
instability in an already struggling nation.67   
The judicial system can operate on local or international levels. The ICC is a 
permanent court that tries individuals according to international law and responds to 
accusations of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, et al.  Ad-hoc trials are 
tribunals created to specifically deal with in the aftermath of the tragedy; such was the 
case in Nuremberg, Tokyo and Yugoslavia.68 They are typically mandated by the United 
Nations Security Council and focus on the case’s specific needs instead of operating 
within a larger judiciary.   Ad-hoc trials can take place in the country in question on a 
local level as opposed to at The Hague, and focus around domestic laws.  
Lastly, new regimes can employ a combination of both and host hybrid trials that 
combine international and domestic procedures. Trials are held locally and adhere to 
local demands but are overseen by an international body. Hybrid trials can use legal 
personnel from an international organization but instead of having traditional trials with a 
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prosecution, defense, and conviction, they focus more on local traditions that would 
resonate more with its participants.69  In some cases, there may be confessions in 
exchange for punishment and the court may administer rehabilitative local rituals 
possessing greater symbolic meaning for the indigenous population and is therefore 
easier for participants to accept.70  
Some scholars suggest the ICC is more likely to be viewed as impartial and their 
actions are less likely to be viewed as retributive by the incoming regime. An 
international body conducts proceedings as opposed to the succeeding regime, whose 
actions may come across as vengeful. The ICC is already staffed with people experienced 
in international law and the procedures for responding to widespread abuses that occurred 
over long periods of time.71  Kritz points out that when perpetrators have fled from the 
regions where violations occurred, as was the case in Bosnia, international organizations 
may be the only ones with the resources and jurisdiction to extradite individuals and put 
them on trial, whether in the ICC or at an ad-hoc tribunal.72  
Despite the advantages of international trials, there are still shortfalls that can lead 
to alienating parts of the populations and increasing mistrust.  If using the ICC, only the 
few high-ranking officials involved in planning the crimes are prosecuted, while the 
several hundred men and women who carried out the crimes are often not included in the 
process.73 Using the ICC may fail to resonate with a local population since the trials are 
in a foreign land, using foreign procedures, and not trying the criminals that victims 
crossed paths with during the conflict.  
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If an international tribunal is used, more members of the outgoing regime can be 
tried, but this presents its own set of challenges.  International tribunals can handle a 
larger amount of cases, but since they are set up with help from the new regime, they can 
be viewed as retributive and biased against the old regime.74 As was the case with the 
Nuremberg trials, Kirchheimer notes that the judges were selected from the winners of 
World War II and included no German judges.75  He goes on to say that the exclusion of 
German judges from the trial left Germans defendants at the mercy of a system they were 
not familiar with, which was sometimes viewed as advantageous to the prosecution.  
Tribunals can solve the issue of not trying enough people but can also result in large 
numbers of the old regime’s sympathizers being expunged from the new political 
framework.  This expulsion can breed feelings of isolation, creating an underground 
opposition hostile to the democratization underway.76   
Hybrid tribunals can resonate strongly with the local population by incorporating 
the local customs and traditions while following international standards.  According to 
Rosanna Lipscomb, a hybrid tribunal “allows for strengthening of the domestic rule of 
law while ensuring fairness and impartiality.”77  Hybrid courts take from both 
international and domestic prosecutions and have been credited with legitimizing local 
courts, improving domestic rule of law and helping to build support around a newly 
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formed government.78 This can be most useful in cases such as Sudan, where the conflict 
had ethnic undertones, or in Rwanda, which had a large number of participants.79   
Unfortunately, hybrid tribunals’ efforts to conform to local laws can lead to them 
conflicting with international laws, and therefore losing credibility on the global stage 
while simultaneously undermining international law and years of precedence. Hybrid 
tribunals can also be difficult to set up, and, since they are conducted on a local level, are 
also prone to being labeled as “victor’s justice.”  As a hypothetical, when using local 
traditions, which tribes’ rituals do you use? Are traditions meant for healing in one 
region, offensive or meaningless to another?  Incorporating local norms can foster 
complications and lead to proceedings easily being labeled as biased, unfair or retributive 
by the local population.   
Non-Judicial Options 
A widely used non-judicial option is a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to 
investigate what happened and produce official accounts of the abuses.80 As defined by 
Priscilla Hayner, “Truth commissions ... are bodies set up to investigate a past history of 
violations of human rights in a particular country – which can include violations by the 
military or other government forces or by armed opposition forces.” 81 They have been 
used in several countries and can provide solace to victims and their families who were 
mistreated for years, but sometimes under the guise of legitimacy, denials, or lack of 
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acknowledgement of what was happening.82  In other instances, there are several versions 
of the truth that can be divided by ethnicity and region.  Creating official accounts may 
help bridge divides and lend a voice to people who have been silenced for generations.83  
The literature praises Truth Commissions for being capable of addressing a wide range of 
abuses that include disappearances, mass graves, torture, kidnapping, and gender-based 
violence.84 This official accounting of events can also be used to determine levels of guilt 
as was done in Rwanda and Germany.85 Additionally, articles by Priscilla Hayner and 
David Forsythe purport that these commissions can also promote reconciliation by 
including both victim statements and guilty confessions. Lastly, experts recommend 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions due to the fluid nature of these commissions; they 
can be easily adapted for different regions, accommodate multiple violations, and be 
tailored to meet the conflict’s regional undertones.86   
Despite the importance of truth telling in the transitional justice process, Truth 
and Reconciliation Commissions can present their own set of problems in relation to 
building trust amongst a community. When commissions are created, there is always a 
mandate, creating boundaries, and stating the commissions’ objectives. While this helps 
define the commission’s responsibilities, it can also result in biased reporting, and the 
presentation of a particular set of truths instead of a clear picture of the entire situation. 
Hayner points to Uruguay’s mandate to investigate disappearances, which left out 
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detention and torture, where most of violations took place.87 A narrow scope also 
impacted outcomes in Uganda when time constraints prevented the commission from 
examining the current regime in charge, thereby only reporting on a previous regime’s 
transgressions while ignoring the one currently in power.88 Hayner also suggests 
commissions can be a political tactic used to improve their international reputation with 
regards to their human rights policies.89  She states, “Given the mandate of commissions, 
by definition, to look at the past rather than the present, it is easy for a new government to 
justify not being subject to the investigations of the commission, while professing 
improved human rights policies.”90  Moreover, many commissions are mandated by the 
country’s incumbent president, which can quickly lead it to being labeled as victor’s 
revenge since the ruling party is in charge of creating the mandate and setting the scope.  
There can also be a fear that these commissions will re-open old wounds and lead to new 
violence.  Commissions have no prosecutorial jurisdiction, so after uncovering detailed 
accounts of violence and publically naming the perpetrators, participants can be left 
without any promise of prosecution and vulnerable to violent retribution.91  
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions can provide insight into the victims and 
what they require to heal.  Consequently, this led to the idea of victim reparation, 
especially in impoverished regions where basic needs may trump the mental healing that 
trials or reconciliation brings.92  If possible, states can provide material reparations such 
as monetary compensation, improperly seized property, or cover costs such as healthcare, 
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education, or provide employment.93 Victims subjected to violence were regarded as 
second-class citizens and were robbed of property, belongings, and all their assets. As 
evidenced in Sierra Leone, inquiries showed that citizens were more concerned with 
basic needs, the costs of education, health care, clothing, and jobs.94 As the Sierra Leone 
example shows, repaying some of this, including returning seized property, can help 
make the transition more comfortable.95   
While victim compensation may help address some of the more immediate 
concerns after years of brutal repression, it can also fail to heal wounds and make a 
population feel as if justice was served.  On a practical level, many new governments 
may not be equipped to hand out reparations amidst this transition.  The literature 
reminds us that many governments undergoing this transition have inherited a country 
reeling from violence.  This violence is likely to have also impacted its economic 
performance and therefore monetary compensation could further destabilize the country’s 
financial security.96  Furthermore, since the process of transitional justice frequently 
implies regime change, a new regime would be in charge for handing out reparations for 
crimes they may not have committed.97  Lastly, the literature suggests victims may also 
not be in favor of compensation because they may feel like they are being bribed or that 
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their pain has a price tag.98  This perception of being given “blood money” can be 
exaggerated if the compensation is not paired with punishment for those responsible for 
the committing these violations.99  Hesitation regarding victim compensation from both 
the new government and its victims can make it a risky move not guaranteed to build 
trust or legitimacy; the literature shows that by itself, victim compensation is unable to 
bridge communities or promote legitimacy in the transitional justice process. 
Another option frequently employed when abuses were carried out by large 
groups of people with support of collaborators or sympathizers are non-criminal 
sanctions.100  These sanctions include purges from political, security and military 
institutions, confessions of guilt and subsequent bans from participation in the new 
regime. The literature suggests non-criminal sanctions apply to the passive participants 
that created buffers between victims and the people who were involved first-hand in the 
planning or execution of war crimes.  Examples include regime sympathizers, political 
elites, or parties that were knowledgeable and complacent amidst the wrongdoings.  To 
account for this group, new regimes can employ non-criminal sanctions to purge them 
from sectors of society.  They can be removed from political office, the military, or local 
security forces.  As was done in Greece, France and Germany, people can be interrogated 
about their level of involvement, dismissed from civil institutions and banned from 
political participation.101  Also referred to as Lustration, it can sidestep criminal 
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prosecution and act as a middle ground between criminal sanctions and widespread 
amnesty.102   
Lustration can also lead to mistrust and deepen divisions in an already fragile 
state.  If not done carefully, Herman Schwartz suggests lustration can give the appearance 
of placing collective guilt on large sectors of society generating feelings of alienation.103  
In addition, as seen in post-communist Eastern Europe, new regimes may purge people 
from jobs or political office and then face accusations that their dismissals were 
motivated by personal vendettas or discrimination.104  Lustration may be viewed as ill 
willed by the new regime and make the population once again feel like they are becoming 
victims of “victor’s justice.” 
The last mechanism at one’s disposal is the process of “forgetting,” which can be 
a combination of sweeping amnesties and the new government’s declaration to not revisit 
past abuses. Forgetting is implemented with hopes of speeding up reconciliation without 
the drawn out process of reliving its past.105 The literature analyzing transitional justice 
methods does not spend a great deal of time examining “forgetting.” The majority of 
writers seem to be operating under the assumption that choosing to not revisit the past is 
akin to ignoring it and could undermine democratization.106  
An exception to this is Oscar Encarnacion, who uses Spain and Portugal as 
counterfactuals to point out transitional justice theory needs to diversify its research and 
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options.107 In the 1970’s Spain’s government decided that moving on quickly was 
necessary for the country to move past General Francisco Franco’s dictatorship.108  The 
government feared revisiting the past would increase instability, prompt vigilante 
violence and create anxiety for families of those in the military that participated in the 
abuses. As a result, the Spanish government made an agreement called Pacto del Olvido 
(Pact of Forgetting), which Encarnacion describes as, “collective amnesia about past 
political excesses.”109 The pact delivered amnesties and lacked any trials, reconciliation 
commissions or purges from the government or military. There was a conscious decision 
to avoid any proceedings examining past abuses. The literature suggests that the Spanish 
people then rallied around democratization, in part because they did not have to relive the 
past.110 Alternatively, in Portugal, the government immediately started with military 
purges that quickly expanded to the civil service, business elite, educators, media and the 
church.111 The country-wide expulsion “turned into a veritable witch-hunt that dispensed 
justice so arbitrarily and radically that it nearly derailed the democratic transition.”112 
Although these two examples go against most transitional justice scholarship and 
present alternative insights, they do not speak to building trust amongst communities.  
Portugal’s case once again explains how transitional justice, if not conduced properly, 
can devolve into acts of revenge that destabilize an entire nation.  Spain’s decision not to 
allow for any prosecution or reconciliation commissions prevents both domestic and 
international communities from having access to how people may feel about the process. 
                                                     








This could prevent any additional insight from being shed Francoism’s impact on the 
Spanish psyche.  
In addition to providing judicial and non-judicial options, transitional justice 
scholarship provides observations based on implementers’’ past experiences. For 
example, understanding the role of the outgoing regimes factors into which methods the 
incoming regime may choose.  The manner of the outgoing regime’s abuses and how 
they relinquish power can provide indicators about next steps.  Understanding outgoing 
regimes contributes to how a country can decide on which transitional justice processes 
to apply to promote inclusion and reduce alienation amongst the people. Strong 
authoritarian regimes that voluntarily ended were not prosecuted as frequently or as 
harshly as regimes that collapsed or were overthrown.113  In addition, if regimes turned 
power over peacefully or through negotiations they were given a more prominent role in 
the new regime.  They were also less likely to be prosecuted and more likely to be part of 
a negotiated settlement that allowed them to continue operating as a political party. This 
post-transition role also helped determine the extent that abusers were punished or 
pardoned.114  
The literature also distinguishes between militant and liberal democracies to show 
another consideration when employing transitional justice.  Militant democracies were 
more common in Europe, especially because of the pre-war Weimar Republic Germany’s 
tailspin into Nazi Germany and World War II.  The Nazi party’s reliance on propaganda, 
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manipulation and lies against non-Aryan communities led the new governments to be 
more cautious and restrictive to things like hate speech and holocaust deniers.115  On the 
other hand, the American Revolution was hypersensitive to receiving proper 
representation and created a liberal democracy focused on protecting minority rights and 
free speech.116   
The literature however, does not account for internal conflict playing a large role in 
transitional justice; most cases are presented as a non-democratic regime versus a united 
and oppressed electorate. In Uganda, the conflict is presented as the Lord’s Resistance 
Army against the government; in Rwanda it was the Hutus and the Tutsis. Both of these 
generalizations do not account for diversity in culture, religion, social class or level of 
victimization. Now, the same thing is happening with the civil war in Syria is between 
supporters and opposition to Bashar Al-Assad. However, Syria is made up of several 
ethnic minorities including Druze, Christians, Alawites, and Muslims. Some of these 
groups may be temporarily united in their struggle with or against Assad; but, they still 
struggle with their own ethnic tensions which will re-emerge after the civil war has 
ended.  
Tackling the challenges of reconciliation between a past-regime and post-transition 
society is complicated by a country that has several internal divisions it has to overcome. 
This will make it harder for governments to promote legitimacy and rein in instances of 
collective guilt or retributive justice. The countries undergoing regime-change and 
nations expected to undergo changes over the next half-century are not homogenous 
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societies, and understanding the impact of domestic divisions will help yield better 
transitional justice.  
Despite previous experiences and case studies there are still unaddressed concerns 
that may prevent safe, stable, and democratic transitions. Chief among these concerns is 
how to account for tribal and internal strife.  In past cases of transitional justice, conflicts 
tend to be defined by the oppressors and the oppressed. That can lead to a generalization 
of who the victims were and who was at fault.  For example, in regimes involving forced 
military conscription, or participate for fear of violence against their family; those who 
committed crimes may feel like victims may be treated as the perpetrators in a tribunal or 
reconciliation commission. Failure to account for these facets could be hurtful for future 
transitions. In Egypt, Afghanistan, and Syria, countries that may need to employ 
transitional justice methods in the near future, governments will not only have to deal 
with past abuses but also account for deep ethnic, tribal, religious and cultural divides 
within their borders.117   
Since the legitimacy of transitional justice is a key to ensuring its success, who 
conducts the proceedings sets the foundation for its success. I will study how mistrust 
impacts deciding who conducts transitional justice. Regardless of the country, when 
transitional justice is taking place, there are several factors of society that have to be 
incorporated into the process, and failing to do so hinders the process in either the short 
or long term. To demonstrate the importance, I will use a comparative case study method 
with Uganda and Rwanda, showing the difficulties with both judicial and non-judicial 
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options, and emphasizing the importance on deciding who will carry out the methods of 
transitional justice.  
In Uganda’s case, decades of conflict led to multiple sectors falling victim to 
violence.  The case study shows that the widespread conflict led to differing needs 
amongst the population, creating several variables in the transition process. In Rwanda’s 
case, the government and international community quickly found that the genocide’s 
nature made it difficult to establish legitimacy and label victims and perpetrators, because 
much of the violence was coerced. Rwandans worked to implement both judicial and 
non-judicial forms of justice to deal with the genocide’s organizers and also its 
perpetrators.   
METHODOLOGY 
A comparative case study of both Uganda and Rwanda will effectively illustrate the 
difficulties in deciding which methods of transitional justice to implement, especially 
when trying to maximize legitimacy.  Comparing these two countries allows the paper to 
argue the importance of building trust amongst the community by examining conflicts 
that struggled with both judicial and non-judicial options, in both quick and drawn-out 
conflicts.  
The case studies will specifically focus on Uganda and Rwanda, both countries that 
experienced conflicts where leaders have been indicted for crimes against humanity by 
the United Nations because they incorporate instances of documented cases of violence 
against large swaths of society.  The case studies will trace how these conflicts create 
deep divisions between different sectors of the population and which methods of 
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transitional justice, involving either domestic or international actors, would be carrying 
out the justice.  
Violence in Uganda spanned several years and was characterized by violence that 
became divided along tribal lines and transformed a counterinsurgency against the 
Ugandan government into an ethnic conflict. The swiftness of Rwanda’s genocide created 
an urgent and unfamiliar need for justice and reconciliation where both judicial and non-
judicial options were problematic.  Examining transitional justice efforts in regards to the 
Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda and Rwanda’s genocide will show how post-conflict 
divisions can serve as a hindrance to a successful transition. 
Uganda 
Two decades of conflict and violence in Uganda exacerbated the already existing 
ethnic cleavages. With child abductions for the purpose of forced conscription in the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), extreme poverty, torture, and war, at its peak, the 
country lost 1,000 people every week.118 The protracted conflict touched the lives of 
nearly every Ugandan and created a need to reconcile several million people who all 
experienced the LRA’s violence in different ways. The following is a brief re-telling of 
how the main campaigns between Uganda’s government and the LRA, along with the 
country’s diversity created several challenges in choosing a strategy to help reconcile its 
people.   
In the early 1980’s, an institutional vacuum was created as Uganda recovered 
from the brutal overthrow of Idi Amin’s military dictatorship. Intrastate power struggles 
ensued and the new government’s army was a loosely held conglomerate of former 
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militias.119  The police and military forces were fractured and incapable of maintaining 
law and order. As factions fought for power, the National Resistance Movement Army 
(NRA/M) emerged and was faced with the task of fighting off rival armed groups.  After 
a cease-fire between the NRA/M and insurgent forces fell apart, some of the insurgency’s 
militias re-grouped and LRA was created under Joseph Kony’s leadership.120   
 The NRA/M countered the LRA with a scorched-earth policy and recruited 
civilian volunteers, ex-soldiers, and rebels along the way. They provided policing, crowd-
control, broke up demonstrations and riots, and fought back the LRA.121 The NRA/M 
recruits were generally grouped by ethnicity and protected local villages from rebel 
attacks.  These groupings gave the illusion that the allegiances were ethnicity-based and 
blurred civilian and military lines, causing the conflict to escalate quickly.  Indiscriminant 
violence began on both sides and the LRA interpreted any lack of enlistment in its ethnic 
strongholds as a sign of sympathy to the NRA/M.122  Kony’s forces began treating 
civilians as targets and started torturing, maiming, raping and murdering them.  He 
indiscriminately massacred villages and enslaved children in the military. 
  In response to Kony’s growing power, Sudan agreed to help Ugandan forces by 
launching another militia, Operation Iron Fist.123  The operation forced the LRA to retreat 
into the north, but instead of weakening them, the LRA consolidated its forces and the 
conflict intensified in areas where the government’s presence was weakest. Eventually 
militias were able to drive the LRA from the region but their tactics drew criticism from 
fellow Ugandans.  Just as the LRA had committed several human rights violations whilst 
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fighting, the Operation Iron Fist militias were also viewed as “trigger happy, brutal, 
hiring out guns for robbery and criminal violence; engaging in corrupt practice such as 
falsification of documents, impersonation and sale food rations.”124 
 Uganda’s weak government was devoid of any law enforcement or security 
structure. Lack of democratic institutions and constant violence led to a heavy reliance on 
militias.  The Ugandan militias managed state security, waged war, and attempted to 
provide basic security to its citizens being slaughtered by the LRA. They were central 
tenets in Uganda’s security structure at every level, from local and riot police with batons 
to soldiers fighting the LRA.  
 The use of militias in lieu of traditional state security was detrimental to the 
Ugandan government and its people because they lacked legitimacy and blurred the lines 
between fighters and civilians.  The lack of clarity increased violence and morphed the 
insurgency into an ethnic war with gross atrocities committed by both sides.  Judging 
from Paul Omach’s analysis of militias in Political Violence in Uganda: the Role of 
Vigilantes and Militias, an emphasis on creating legitimacy and centralizing power could 
have been more effective.  Instead of using precious resources to recruit and train local 
militias the Ugandan government should have streamlined resources to improve the state 
security system.125  Doing so may have unified people, provided legitimacy and 
encouraged cohesion among an ethnically diverse population.  The state could have 
provided security, but more importantly, distinguished between government forces and 
militias. This may have helped enforce the boundaries between law enforcement and 
vigilante violence hoping to soften the ethnic undertones.   Instead, deepened divisions 
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pitted the population against one another, and escalated the conflict, making the process 
of reconciliation very complicated.   
 Using children in the military was also one of the Kony’s defining tactics. He 
would abduct hundreds of thousands young boys and girls and use them as soldiers and 
sexual slaves respectively.  The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
recognized the basic unalienable rights of all children and drafted a piece of legislation 
titled, “Optional protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict” (CRC-OP-
AC), which included laws on the military use of children.126 It split the military use of 
children into three subsections of child soldiers, sexual slaves and human shields.  
Violation of this international law led to a hurdle for transitional justice because 
perpetrators were often young kids indoctrinated into the military by force.  
Bridging these divisions meant bringing together not only different religions and 
ethnic groups but also multiple income-levels and different types of victims.  People were 
assaulted, beaten, and robbed but there were also children forced into conscription who 
committed crimes under fear for their own lives. There are accounts of children being 
kidnapped by the LRA and forced to attack their neighbors, former classmates, family 
members, and friends.127 The diversity in victimization creates what Erin Baines refers to 
as “an erosion of social trust.”128 Additionally, participation in a vigilante militia to police 
one’s neighborhood became a cultural norm in Uganda. Many young boys were expected 
to take up arms against intruders, thus blurring the lines between civilians, targets, 
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victims, and perpetrators.129 As the conflict drew to a close and people returned home 
from displacement camps, they were forced to live near former neighbors who may have 
betrayed them in the past.  In response, the Ugandan government attempted to implement 
a comprehensive plan of reconciliation commissions and prosecutions which did little to 
promote trust or legitimacy.130  
The United Nations launched the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of 
Human Rights in Uganda.  While researching participation levels, the UN found the 
general population eager to participate, but not the elite.131  The elite did not want to 
bring more attention to the conflict, fearing they would not lead to prosecution for the 
perpetrators. People had similar reactions to a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and 
thought reliving the past would increase hostility in already unstable communities. Many 
people lived in close proximity to perpetrators, and, although fear of retribution was high, 
agreed that ignoring the past was not an option.132  This lack of trust in international or 
national proceedings led to the suggestion of using local rituals and tribal practices to 
ease tensions and help reunify the villages.133 Local elders performed cleansing 
ceremonies, such as egg-stepping, to help foster a fresh-start and move past any atrocities 
committed by people before returning home.134  Erin Baines gives the example of a 
young boy who felt haunted by the spirit of a boy the LRA forced him to kill.  He felt as 
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though the spirit would leave him alone if he confessed to the village and the boy’s 
family, feared admitting his mistakes, even if reconciliation was at stake.135  
Under Joseph Kony’s notorious leadership, the LRA used rape as a weapon, 
forced child-recruitment and tortured, maimed and murdered countless men, women and 
children.  These tactics pitted communities against one another and intensified mistrust in 
the community; consequently, the tactics now pose obstacles to successfully 
implementing the most commonly used forms of reconciliation.  Unable to find comfort 
in traditional transition options, villages focused on encouraging spiritual healing to help 
communities live together once again.  Though these traditional efforts may have helped 
bring communities back together, they did not coincide with international norms, nor did 
they address the LRA’s habitual violations of international law. They were not able to 
provide accountability against perpetrators but did contribute to reconciliation.  
Both judicial and non-judicial options were unable to garner participation from 
the elite and poor populations. While spiritual mechanisms did encourage some 
participation on a micro-level operating within the confines of villages or tribes, they 
were unable to translate to a national effort.  Traditional methods also ignore a founding 
characteristic of transitional justice methods, to respond to violations of international law. 
Enforcing international law will hold people liable but set an example for other bad 
actors. It will also let affected populations know that the international community is 
committed to holding these violent leaders accountable.  Spirit-healing does not 
incorporate legal proceedings, record-keeping, or any mechanisms to ensure honesty and 
transparency. Lastly, it is stewarded by local leaders and does not require interaction with 
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the national government, therefore making it difficult to tie local mechanisms to a 
national effort to encourage democracy and trust in a new government.     
Rwanda 
The genocide in Rwanda was quick and bloody.  It was conducted by militias and 
civilians who killed nearly a million people in just a few months.136  These tremendous 
acts of violence stretched across all sectors of society, pit two tribes against one another, 
and created serious obstacles to both judicial and non-judicial transitional justice options.  
Trials proved to be expensive, lengthy, and unrealistic, because of the large amount of 
civilian participation. Non-judicial options which were able to reach a larger amount of 
people came rife with biases, lack of quality control, and ignored some violations 
altogether.  The following is a summary of Rwanda’s genocide and an account of the 
trouble the country faced when implementing transitional justice.  It outlines 
considerations both the international and local community took into during 
implementation and explains why multiple attempts failed to establish legitimacy or ease 
tribal tensions.  
In 1994, the Rwandan president’s plane went down near its capital city of Kigali, 
which was viewed by many as involving suspicious circumstances.  The next four months 
set off a bloody genocide that claimed the lives of nearly one million people and left 
another two million displaced.  Hutu members of the government and military used radio 
and propaganda to encourage civilians and militias to take up arms against the Tutsis and 
they promised money, food, and land.137  Hutus massacred anyone suspected of being a 
Tutsi or suspected of sympathizing with them. During this time, foreign forces in the area 
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were evacuated immediately, fearful of what was to come.  This sent a message to both 
perpetrators and victims that the violence was being ignored by the international 
community and allowed the conflict to escalate.  
Reports show people were forced to participate in the massacres or face being 
labeled a sympathizer and at risk of death.  The murders were especially brutal, using 
clubs, machetes, sexual violence, physical beatings, and burnings, often of neighbors and 
friends. In just a few months, an estimated 10% of the Rwandan population and 75% of 
the country’s Tutsi population was murdered.138    
To begin the healing process, in 1994, the United Nations established the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). An ad-hoc system was established to 
help Rwanda find a balance between international standards and cultural relativity, but 
failed to do.139 Trials are expensive, as they require enough money to hire attorneys, 
conduct investigations, as well as other miscellaneous expenditures such as providing 
accommodations for the people taking part in the trial.140 Reports suggest the estimated 
cost for the ICTR was 1 billion dollars.141  This includes the full length of the trial, which 
is anywhere from two to five years.  There was a large number of people to be tried and 
no way to efficiently prosecute them in a timely manner. It was also difficult to use the 
ICTR as a way to make the Rwandan population feel as if justice was being served 
because there were difficulties sending updates and coverage about what the tribunal was 
doing, even radio transmissions took too long to establish.142   This led to the release of 
                                                     
138 Heide Rieder and Elbert Thomas, “Rwanda - Lasting Imprints of a Genocide: Trauma, Mental Health 
and Psychosocial Conditions in Survivors, Former Prisoners and their Children," Conflict & Health 
7(2013): 2. 
139 Towner, “Documenting Genocide,” 290-291. 
140Rupert Skilbeck, “Funding Justice: The Price of War Crimes Trials,” Human Rights Brief 15:3 (2008): 6. 
141 Skillbeck, “Funding Justice.” 6. 
142 Kritz, “Coming to Terms,” 132. 
51 
 
prisoners, blanket amnesties and the use of the Gacaca courts to help move the process 
along.  
The Gacaca courts combined the structure of an international court and the 
reconciliatory nature of confessions and truth telling.  The courts served as a vehicle for 
the Rwandan public trying those who had confessed to genocide.143  It was initially 
viewed as more legitimate and thousands of people were willing to participate. The 
Gacaca’s mission was tasked with the “organization and prosecution of offences 
constituting the crime of genocide and massacres or other crimes against humanity, 
committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994.”144  However, due to the 
court’s scope, several crimes were left out, which deepened already troubling ethnic 
cleavages.  
While the general population was much more in favor of Gacaca courts than the 
ICTR, it still came with its share of problems. Because of the time span of the court’s 
mandate, the crimes were mainly committed by Hutus, and ignored violence committed 
by the Tutsis leading up to and near the end of the genocide. Some Rwandans also 
thought the Gacaca courts lacked efficacy, because they did not provide reparations for 
victims; some also felt they courts did not spend enough time addressing victims of 
sexual violence.145 This led some people to label the Gacaca courts as biased, politically 
motivated and vengeful.146   In addition, the mandate did not extend past Rwanda’s 
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borders and, by default, ignored violence that spilled into neighboring Uganda, Congo 
and Burundi.147 
Additionally, the severity and gravity of violence led to psychological issues that 
continue to impact much of the population. Studies show that sixteen years after the 
conflict, nearly a quarter of all adults “suffered from [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
PTSD], clinically relevant depression and/or anxiety, reflecting the serious mental health 
situation as well as the long-term consequences of mass violence...”148  The study also 
shows that victims and perpetrators alike experienced PTSD. This finding distorts the line 
between oppressors and oppressed and adds yet another angle to the reconciliation 
process.  Unfortunately, the Gacaca strictly defined the scope of inquiry and gave the 
perception that Hutus and Tutsis were perpetrators and victims respectively.  This 
generalization hindered reconciliation efforts and delegitimized the process in the eyes of 
families who felt the courts were driven by victor’s justice and mislabeled Hutus that also 
fell victim to the genocide’s brutality. Limiting the scope of the trials and labeling one 
group as the oppressors, with the others as the victims, is exactly the type of 
generalization that hinders reconciliation. Failing to address the complexity of these 
conflicts and the situations their victims faced deepened ethnic cleavages and made 
marginalized minorities feel even more at risk.    
Determining guilt and if perpetrators acted under a direct threat of violence create 
different types of victims that may benefit from the transitional process. The nature of 
violence also led to psychological scarring in addition to the physical brutalities.  The 
Rwandan genocide presented issues from the onset in determining which form of 
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transitional justice to use.  Soon after establishing international courts, the Rwandan 
government realized they needed a tool that would reach more people and be viewed 
more favorably by the average Rwandan. These courts could have served as a 
compromise to enforce international law while appealing to local populations. While this 
blend sounds like the solution to build legitimacy, the Gacaca courts were viewed as a 
tool for the ruling party and a vindictive measure enabling victor’s to humiliate the 
perpetrators and further intensify the hostile factions. 
CONCLUSION 
Transitional justice comes in many forms and is often seen as vital when 
replacing an oppressive regime with a democratic institution.  In using both restorative 
and retributive forms of justice people hope to help a nation find closure with their pasts 
and create a new cohesive element to lead into the new government. Transitional justice 
can also hold perpetrators accountable for their actions while sending a message to the 
international community that certain acts are intolerable.  Even though it makes sense to 
find closure, new regimes still shy away from implementing transitional justice because 
of how hard it is to find the balance between promoting closure and revisiting bad 
memories.  However, neglecting the past can create its own set of problems, leaving 
developing nations and the international community in a difficult predicament. 
This chapter outlined the variety of methods available to implement transitional 
justice, showing both pros and cons of each approach. After that, I observed that current 
tools need to be expanded to better deal with internal divisions which may lead to 
mistrust in the community and may delegitimize the transitional process.  Analyzing the 
cases of Uganda’s fight against the LRA and the Rwandan Genocide revealed that both 
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judicial and non-judicial options pose stumbling blocks on the road to recovery.  There 
are multiple parts of society that transitional justice seeks to bring together including 
gender, socio-economic status, tribes and religions to name a few; however, the current 
methods boil down a complex problem to the sides of oppressor and oppressed. While 
this simplifies the process, it does not simplify the problem; it creates generalizations and 
does not account for the often blurred lines of perpetrator and victim. Determining which 
method to use is the first step in bringing legitimacy and setting the foundation for 

































Chapter 3: Why Transitional Justice Consistently Fails to Prioritize Outreach 
 
INTRODUCTION  
As outlined in previous chapters, countries can implement transitional justice in 
the aftermath of a violent regime’s departure. These violent regimes ignore international 
law while committing human rights violations and eliminating the rule of law. These 
judicial and non-judicial procedures aid the affected population’s healing while 
rebuilding governing institutions. The tools available for transitional justice can be 
judicial—International Criminal Court (ICC), ad hoc tribunals, or a hybrid of the two—or 
non-judicial—Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC), victim compensation, non-
criminal sanctions, amnesties, or a concept of forgetting atrocities to move forward. 149 
Regardless of the method chosen, the tools are intended to either punish or pardon the 
perpetrators, and balance reconciliation with retribution.  
 Though the process is intended to reconcile communities and hold perpetrators 
accountable, a delicate balance of several actors vying for control must be made. These 
competing interests may include local populations, political opposition, international 
actors, and outgoing elites afraid of prosecution. Bringing stakeholders together decide 
on and implement a process that brings them together is incredibly challenging. 
Additionally, since the countries in question have generally been marred by decades of 
abuses and violent governments, rebuilding trust is an essential component of moving 
forward. Having the affected populations buy-in to the process, view it as legitimate, and 
thereby be willing to participate is both difficult and necessary  
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 To encourage participation and spread information about the measures to be 
executed, implementers can conduct outreach programs. As defined by the International 
Center for Transitional Justice, outreach is, “a set of tools – combination of materials and 
activities – that a TJ [transitional justice] measure puts in place to build direct channels of 
communication with affected communities, in order to raise awareness of the justice 
process and promote understanding of the measure.”150  
As mentioned in chapter one, several transitional justice experts suggest that 
implementing transitional justice advances democratization. Therefore, international 
organizations, emerging democracies, developed countries and their security forces can 
all benefit from gaining an understanding of how outreach programs alter transitions. 
However, forging trust between divided communities and multiple stakeholders within a 
transitioning society by implementing outreach is still unresolved within transitional 
justice literature. In the following sections, I show how outreach impacts transitional 
justice proceedings, how it is conducted, how it can be useful, and point out that it is 
unfortunately consistently underfunded and underutilized. Even though outreach 
programs bring legitimacy to the process, which is critical in a post-conflict society, there 
is very little discussion of why outreach continues to be underutilized. This paper posits 
this question and furthermore, asks why, if such a potential exists, research is not directed 
at understanding outreach’s underutilization. 
I hypothesize that obstacles people face while conducting and organizing outreach 
programs hinders the process and shows why these programs are frequently 
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underutilized. Due to the lack of literature examining outreach, I bring in works from 
global health campaigns that face similar barriers in developing countries. Because global 
health campaigns are frequently conducted in developing countries, they face many of the 
same barriers that outreach programs do. They also lack infrastructure, either mid or post-
conflict, and face similar logistical challenges. The major difference is the way they 
prioritize outreach, or as they call it, social mobilization. After outlining the processes 
and setbacks involved in outreach programs, the paper will show how global health 
campaigns overcome similar hurdles. This paper argues that altering the current outreach 
model to mimic best practices from global health campaigns, interested parties can better 
increase their outreach efforts, thereby having a more inclusive, informed, and 
reconciliatory process.  
Outreach 
 Informing the affected population about transitional justice methods being 
undertaken and creating a connection between the processes and the people they intend to 
help is a critical component of the transition. However, both judicial and non-judicial 
methods present their own sets of challenges. Experts state that both domestic and 
international criminal tribunals can be difficult to explain to local populations.151 Non-
judicial methods such as TRC’s are heavily reliant on participation by the affected 
population and therefore also benefit from extensive outreach efforts. In the following 
sections, I use the current body of literature on transitional justice methods and outreach 
programs to show why outreach is critical, how the programs are conducted, and why it 
has historically been underutilized.     
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Why it is needed 
 The literature states that outreach programs are an essential component to 
transitional justice proceedings and their eventual goals of retribution and 
reconciliation.152 Successful programs bring much-needed legitimacy to the process 
among key victim populations as well as the general population of an affected region or 
country.153 Conducting outreach also educates local populations on the rule-of-law, builds 
confidence in a judiciary, and helps the targeted population feel ownership in the 
process.154 Research shows that outreach programs can help control the conversation, and 
prevent political factions or groups with ulterior motives from undermining the 
process.155  
In the Central African Republic, researchers conducted a study to understand how 
outreach programs raised awareness about the International Criminal Court (ICC), how 
people in the region acquire their news and information, and how that impacted their 
perceptions of the ICC.156 In the Central African Republic, the ICC used newspapers and 
radio programs to reach out to the local population.157 They broadcasted programming in 
local languages, held workshops to engage the victims and answer questions, and 
explained the basic functions of the ICC.158 The study found that people that used 
newspapers and radio as their primary information sources knew more about the ICC, and 
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those that knew more about the ICC had a more positive view.159 Those relying on 
neighbors, tended to be female, less educated, and poorer than those with access to 
newspapers; 32 percent of women, and only 16 percent of men were considered 
uninformed.160 And, while 51 percent of those surveyed used print media, 38 percent 
relied on neighbors. Another important finding was that people that did not have access 
to radio and newspapers and instead relied on their local communities and friends for 
information were less aware of what the ICC was, its activities, and how it was 
performing.161  These statistics show how those who are better informed about 
transitional justice proceedings are more likely to understand the processes and support 
them.  
Further proof of outreach positively impacting the transitional justice process is 
seen in Cambodia during the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC). During the Khmer Rouge trials, outreach efforts conducted by the ECCC 
extended beyond the city of Phnom Penh, where the trials were held, and reached out to 
both survivors and the general population throughout the country.162 Before the trials, 
surveys showed 39 percent of those surveyed did not know anything about the ECCC 
with over 40 percent having very limited knowledge.163 82 percent of respondents could 
not name the five individuals that would be tried and nearly half of all respondents did 
not know it was a hybrid court.164 After television programming, radio shows, newspaper 
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articles, along with other outreach efforts, another survey was taken.165 The follow-up 
survey showed that “awareness of the Court had increased among the adult population, 
with 25 percent of all respondents saying that they had no knowledge of the ECCC 
(compared to the 39 percent in 2008). In addition, 67 percent could adequately describe 
the Court as a hybrid court (compared to the 53 percent in 2008), and 11 percent could 
correctly name the individuals who had been arrested (compared to 3 percent in 
2008).”166  Here the results once again show a correlation between outreach efforts and 
increased awareness of outreach efforts and knowledge of transitional justice 
proceedings.  
The literature also shows how failing to conduct outreach programs from the 
outset of transitional justice proceedings creates an information vacuum leading to people 
being both uninformed and misinformed with the process. Politicians, elites vying for 
power, or those trying to discredit the process can fill the void with false or tainted 
information with hopes of pushing their own agendas.167 The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) delayed outreach programs allowed 
domestic political elites to color the process as biased, one-sided, and ethnically-
motivated.168 A lack of educational outreach during Peru’s TRC and lack of engagement 
with the local media was cited as a major factor in the commission’s inability to educate 
Peruvians on the TRC’s purpose.169 
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 Victim participation, getting affected communities to participate in the 
proceedings by providing testimony during trials, taking part in healing rituals, 
contributing accounts for TRC’s, and other such activities are a critical part of both the 
reconciliatory and retributive goals of transitional justice mechanisms.170 Scholars say 
that victim participation is not only necessary to conduct proceedings, but their inclusion 
“empowers survivors, engender[s] individual healing and social trust, and promote[s] 
accountability and the rule of law.”171 This participation also requires finding the victims, 
informing them of the proceedings, explaining what is needed, and sometimes physically 
transporting them to trials, commissions, or other proceedings. Per the literature, a 
significant reason outreach is helpful for victim participation is its potential to tackle to 
above-mentioned challenges.172 During conflict, thousands and sometimes millions of 
victims may flee to neighboring villages, cities, or countries in search of safety.173 These 
peoples are often victims themselves or witnessed the atrocities committed. Experts 
purport that reaching out to these affected diasporas to gain an accurate recounting of 
what occurred, as well as gathering testimony for trials, can be essential to uncovering the 
truth and promoting reconciliation.        
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Despite outreach programs’ role in aiding a transition, they continue to be 
underutilized in transitional justice proceedings. The examination of why they are being 
underutilized, even though they are helpful in building legitimacy and accountability, is 
also under-examined. There is an expanding body of literature surrounding transitional 
justice proceedings, international law, and post-conflict societies, but Outreach programs’ 
impacts and best practices have not been researched and analyzed at length.174 This lack 
of research also contributes to the question of why Outreach programs continue to be 
underutilized. Some of the obstacles briefly mentioned in the literature are related to 
funding, security concerns, logistics, delays in getting started, and language barriers.  
Funding was low or very inconsistent in several cases, which led to under-
staffing, delays in getting offices set up, inability to cover the necessary ground, and 
programming inconsistencies.175 Outreach programs additionally faced logistical 
problems which added to the cost. A lack of physical infrastructure or electronic 
networks makes transportation and disseminating information difficult and expensive. 
Furthermore, the multitude of languages spoken in a region requires translators, and 
printed materials and broadcasts require several languages. This is both time consuming 
and expensive.176  
In some cases, the conflict may be unresolved, which may cause security 
concerns.  Workers are denied access to the area either by their own governments, the 
                                                     
174 Vinck and Pham, “Outreach Evaluation,” 424; Sperfeldt, “Broadcasting Justice,” 4. 
175 Clark, “International War Crimes Tribunals and the Challenge of Outreach,” 113; Vinck and Pham, 
“Outreach Evaluation,” 423; Sperfeldt, “Broadcasting Justice,” 7. 
176 Clark, “International War Crimes Tribunals and the Challenge of Outreach,” 110. 
63 
 
governments of the countries they are operating in, or other international organizations.177 
This may prevent programs from reaching out to affected populations and can also add to 
the cost, whether it is to keep people safe or to find alternate means of getting those in 
danger access to information. Lastly, the lack of prioritization leads to long delays in 
getting these programs started. At times, outreach programs do not start until five or six 
years after transitional justice proceedings are already underway. This leaves ample time 
for outside sources, biased political groups, to establish misperceptions in the affected 
communities. 
METHODOLOGY 
This paper hypothesizes that outreach practices are underutilized because of the 
obstacles they must face. The case studies will show the main obstacles to conducting 
successful outreach programs. Then, comparing the main obstacles with outreach 
programs to the success of global health social mobilization campaigns will show why 
these hurdles leave outreach programs severely underutilized.  
 These hurdles are often the main reason why the programs are underutilized. 
outreach programs are not a priority for those conducting transitional justice. As a result, 
it is consistently underfunded and overwhelmed by challenges of operating in conflict-
ridden societies. They have issues with logistics, cost, staffing, funding, and gaining 
access to victims.  
 Since global health campaigns frequently operate in countries with similar 
hurdles, they often face similar challenges regarding logistics and access. However, they 
conduct extensive social mobilization campaigns, their version of outreach, and view it as 
critical to a global health campaign’s success. Comparing the two methods, operating 
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under the same in-country constraints, can shed light on how transitional justice 
operations can better incorporate outreach into their efforts, bringing much-needed 
legitimacy to their efforts. 
Under Prioritized 
 Outreach fails to be seen as a priority when establishing transitional justice 
proceedings. Despite the expansive body of literature examining transitional justice, there 
is very little work dissecting outreach programs. It is understudied and under-analyzed 
making best practices even harder to identify.178 Even though there are some studies on 
the tribunals and commissions, very few of the studies seek to understand the relationship 
between outreach programs and increased awareness of the proceedings. 179 
This lack of prioritization often shows itself when the transitional justice methods 
are first employed, and outreach is frequently late to follow. Building a framework to get 
the process started as quickly as possible is critical to the transition’s success.180 While 
offices and programs are established, courts, commissions, and affiliated groups should 
start disseminating information about the proceedings, planning being undertaken, and 
any other salient updates (which they maintain throughout the duration of the 
proceedings). More recently, both Cambodia and East-Timor created steering committees 
to start organizing and getting information out while official offices were established.181  
A failure to do this casts a shadow for the duration of the proceedings. Six years 
passed after the ICTY’s creation for any outreach activities to begin.182  The International 
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Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) also waited over five years before undertaking any 
outreach programs, allowing biased and inaccurate reporting to taint many people’s view 
of the tribunals before their trials even began.183  As mentioned in the previous chapter on 
political elites, people were not confident in the ICTY’s ability to adequately prosecute 
those at fault, to deliver accurate verdicts, or to provide solace to the victims. Many of 
these feelings arose since domestic political elites manipulated the courts purpose for 
political gain. They supported or opposed the Tribunal based on their decision to either 
embrace or demonize the West. Political elites with interests tied to the Tribunals’ 
outcome were also able to control the media’s messaging. This made victims and affected 
populations feel the Tribunal was biased and ineffective.  
 Global health campaigns prioritize outreach much different than transitional 
justice efforts. They use social mobilization, which they describe as efforts to “to engage 
with communities and parents in order to facilitate demand and understanding on the 
importance” of their campaigns.184 Over three decades of global health efforts have 
established social mobilization efforts as an indispensable core component of eradicating 
diseases around the world.185 Another important distinction is that global health 
campaigns tie their social mobilization campaigns to its success. For example, when 
having trouble with Polio in Nigeria and Pakistan, they attribute some of their difficulties 
to lackluster or disorganized mobilization efforts.186 The Polio Eradication Initiative 
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(PEI) is regarded as one of the most ambitious global health campaigns and its central 
focus is on engaging in complex and aggressive social mobilization.187 While global 
health campaigns face many of the same issues that outreach programs do, they prioritize 
their social mobilization campaigns very differently than outreach programs. Many 
global health actors view social mobilization as a top priority, often including it in their 
core functions, and it is frequently endorsed as an effective strategy in increasing public 
awareness and participation.188      
Cost 
 One of the most frequently cited issues with conducting outreach programs is the 
lack of funding. Additionally, detailed information accounting for transitional justice 
expenditures is not available.189 Even if approximations exist, they often concern 
particular tribunals or truth commissions and do not include a breakdown of costs to see 
how much money is spent on outreach efforts. It is important to point out that transitional 
justice procedures are incredibly costly to begin with and there are repeated instances of 
trials running out of money, stalling because of funding gaps, and costing hundreds of 
millions of dollars.190  Furthermore, new democracies often have struggling economies 
recovering from years of conflict, and are less willing to spend large amounts of their 
budgets on these trials unless tied to international assistance.191 However, most experts 
and scholars still agree that it is frequently underfunded. They come to this conclusion by 
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showing that most tribunals, including the International Criminal Court (ICC) do not 
include outreach in their core-funding request. Most outreach programs are forced to rely 
on outside funding. They come from international organizations (European Union), 
individual donors, and other outside donations. 192 
 Since global health campaigns prioritize social mobilization more than 
transitional justice prioritizes outreach, it is frequently funded in a different way. Because 
outreach programs are underfunded, there are not proper accounting measures to even 
show how outreach measures up to the rest of the procedures undertaken. With global 
health campaigns, social mobilization is frequently part of its core infrastructure and 
thereby well-funded.193 In a polio campaign, organizations dedicated between twenty to 
thirty percent of their core funding to social mobilization.194 They also have complex 
transparency and accountability with how their funding is budgeted. Furthermore, they 
bring in funding to fight these global campaigns from multiple sources and ask for multi-
year commitments so funding does not lapse mid-program.195 Additionally, global health 
campaigns work to bring in well-known advocates, such as Bill and Melinda Gates, to 
rally support, bring public awareness, and increase private donations to their causes. 
Their prioritization leads to funding that enables them to tackle many of the logistical 
challenges, outlined below, in a more effective manner.    
Logistics 
 Another major hurdle in conducting outreach is overcoming logistical barriers. 
These logistics include access to the impacted regions, language barriers, and 
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understaffing. Accessing certain populations can be difficult because of distances and 
security. Lack of infrastructure due to underdevelopment or damages inflicted during war 
leave roads, bridges, and public transportation decimated. Language barriers require 
translators to help disseminate information, translate documents, and craft culturally 
appropriate messaging. Understaffing also is also a result of not being prioritized enough 
but leaves those in charge of outreach ill-prepared to tackle the other obstacles proposed 
by logistics.  
 Better funding and prioritization leave social mobilization campaigns better 
equipped for handling logistics-related hurdles. They post public service announcements, 
design pamphlets and literature, reach out to affected villages, and have educational 
videos on their activities.196 They are better staffed and therefore can disperse into more 
rural areas, covering more ground in less time. They are also able to hire translators, or 
hire people locally who are already familiar with the local dialects. In many countries 
such as Chile, Panama, Nigeria, Pakistan and Cameroon, social mobilization campaigns 
are working to employ similar methods to outreach programs, just scaled up.  
Language 
During the War Crimes Chamber of the Court (WCC) of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH), cases were processed in Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian to maximize 
understanding.197  They also distributed materials with details about the Court’s processes 
and verdicts to help build confidence and transparency amongst the locals.198  This 
prevents the information vacuum from taking hold and crippling the process from the 
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start.199 However, the ICTY did not start until several years into the proceedings. Only 
once outreach efforts began six years into the Tribunal, did the translations begin. 
Translations also slowed down efforts in the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), 
although to a lesser extent since there were fewer languages to translate into.200  
Literacy rates are another issue these countries face. Years of conflict often lead 
to an impoverished and uneducated population.201 Not only are language barriers evident 
for translating, but also for comprehension. Levels of illiteracy affected how outreach 
offices used written materials in the Central African Republic, along with many other 
African countries.202 High levels of illiteracy require programs to find innovative ways to 
educate, inform, and communicate with the victims.  
Access to Regions and Understaffing 
 Gaining access to afflicted regions can also be difficult. Terrain, security, and 
permission may pose a challenge to outreach efforts and may add to the cost. Developing 
countries often lack sophisticated infrastructure; after years of war, the infrastructure they 
did have may be severely damaged. This makes indigenous or displaced populations 
difficult to contact.203 In other regions, the conflict is either ongoing, or other conflicts 
are happening nearby. In Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic, outreach 
became very difficult because of security concerns. In Darfur, their government denied 
ICC staff permission to conduct outreach. This forced the ICC to arrange meetings in 
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Europe and other parts of Africa to meet with legal representatives or NGO’s affiliated 
with the victims.204 This added time and multiplied costs.  
Another hurdle occurs in dangerous conflict zones in which the United Nations 
restricts all personnel except those administering humanitarian aid for operating, as we 
saw in the Central African Republic.205 Accessing certain populations is also difficult 
because they are not well organized. Internally Displaced People (IDP) and people with 
disabilities are difficult to contact since they are often scattered throughout the country 
and have moved far away from their home or the conflict zone.206 These minority groups 
may also not have the resources, information, or ability to connect with others.  In some 
countries, women are not allowed to organize or speak without men present.207 This is an 
obstacle when conducting surveys or gathering information in conflict-ridden countries, 
aside from outreach efforts. Interviewing women is an important part of evaluating 
conflicts to understand if rape was used as a weapon in a conflict. Women are also 
frequently at home and in charge of the household, so they can accurately speak to what 
is going on their community. Consequently, reaching out to these displaced and hard to 
reach populations is a critical part of understanding a conflict and rebuilding a post-
conflict society. 
Establishing relationships with several sectors of society such as the media, 
government, and civil societies help lay the groundwork. As an example, the SCSL built 
a relationship with the media from the start; devising a strategy on which communities 
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they would help and what programming would be best; some authors cite this strategy as 
particularly useful when conflict involves strong cultural and ethnic divides, as were 
present in BiH.208 Disseminating print materials is also critical and contains information 
about the goals, function, and proceedings taking place.209 These materials present the 
information clearly, help explain the methods used, and their purposes.210 Furthermore, 
materials can be crafted to target certain audiences, are easy to pass along, and can 
contain graphics, maps, and infographics, for quick consumption.211 Crafting websites 
can also be helpful. These websites feature videos, frequently asked questions, quick 
explanations, photographs, and a mechanism that allows website’s visitors to submit 
questions or comments.212 Other interactive mediums to foster dialogue include blogs, 
discussion forums, and social media.213 The literature outlines several instances where 
radio programming was used. They featured discussions with guests who understood the 
process and let people call-in with questions, as seen in Sierra Leone, Uganda, and the 
Central African Republic.214  
All of this programming requires research, staff, and people experienced at 
building relationships with the affected populations. Due to the lack of attention paid to 
outreach, offices are incredibly understaffed and the extensive preparation and outreach 
needed is next to impossible. In the WCC in BiH, outreach offices did not have their own 
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funding mechanisms and thus only employed three people.215 Those three staffers are 
somehow expected to create the materials, disseminate them to the public, overcome 
language and location barriers, build a relationship with the media, and organize and host 
public forums for victims to learn about the transitional justice measures being used.  
Extreme understaffing is also present in the ICTY. Out of the 1,200 staff members 
working on the tribunal, only two people at The Hague worked on outreach.216 Their 
regional offices are consistently staffed with one or two staffers, with only one authorized 
to speak on the record.217 The SCSL also only had five staffers at The Hague working in 
the outreach office.218 Whether in country or at The Hague, outreach offices are 
consistently grossly understaffed and underfunded, leaving just a handful of people to 
manage an entire country or region’s outreach efforts.   
  Social mobilization campaigns create connections with local leaders and tribal 
elders to enter hard to reach or unsafe areas.219 This helps global health workers convince 
those new to vaccines or other global health campaigns that the medicines and procedures 
are safe and that workers can be trusted. Establishing workers’ legitimacy within rural 
areas is critical to treating people and preventing them from becoming information poor, 
resulting from inadequate outreach.  
While outreach offices often hire between one and five staffers, polio campaigns 
reach out to thousands of religious and community leaders to participate in, and advocate 
for their goals.220 Not only are they reaching out to thousands of local leaders, they also 
work with other global health organizations such as the World Health Organization to 
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integrate thousands of regional employees into the effort.221 Proven helpful in India and 
Pakistan, GPEI focused on educating and religious leaders and convincing them to 
advocate on behalf of the campaigns.222 Religious leaders were able to help protect 
children seeking vaccinations and also were able to explain the good work of health 
workers to skeptical families. In certain circumstances, social mobilization campaigns 
also provided food or other critical services in combination with vaccinations.223 
 Global health campaigns also deal with the challenge of building relationships 
with the media outlets around them. The media will often work against their campaigns 
by spreading rumors and misinformation to discourage people from seeking treatment or 
receiving vaccinations.224 The GPEI devised a strategy that helped improve relationships 
with the media. They found ways to counter biased messaging and worked one on one 
with journalists and members of the media. Since the media outlets are already operating 
in-country they are already well versed in the native languages. By improving relations 
and helping the media outlets recognize their own status as stakeholders in the 
community, it helped media coverage portray global health campaigns in a better light.225  
ANALYSIS 
 Comparing outreach efforts during transitional justice to social mobilization 
efforts in global health campaigns helps show how other institutions operating in 
developing and conflict-ridden countries can overcome the critical work of reaching out 
to their target audiences. Both outreach programs and social mobilization frequently 
operate in third-world countries with inadequate infrastructure, high rates of illiteracy, 
                                                     
221 “Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013–2018,” Global Polio Eradication Initiative, 
published 2012. http://www.polioeradication.org/resourcelibrary/strategyandwork.aspx: 56.  
222 Ibid., 7 
223 Ibid. 
224 Ibid., 36-37. 
225 Ibid., 37.  
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multiple languages, and a population that can be skeptical of their work. However, 
outreach programs are consistently underutilized. Poor outreach programs detract from 
the transition’s legitimacy, a key component on the road to stability, good governance, 
and democratization.  
Even though global health campaigns face similar challenges, they have been 
more successful in gaining favor amongst local populations. They have many of the same 
tactics, such as reaching out the local officials, working with the media, and traveling to 
hard-to-reach areas and rural populations. The above sections compared how outreach 
programs and social mobilization campaigns operate, to understand why global health 
campaigns are more apt at tackling these hurdles.  Understanding how global health 
campaigns, which are more established and experienced than transitional justice 
practices, help form best practices to overcoming these obstacles and conducting 
successful programming in transitional justice campaigns. 
The main differences between the two efforts are the way they prioritize outreach. 
With transitional justice, outreach is grossly understaffed with just a handful of workers 
working on an entire trial, commission, or conflict. Frequently, they are not funded 
through the ICC or the United Nations as the trials are, and forced to find alternate 
financing. At times, outreach does not begin until five or six years into the transition, and 
by that time the media and political elites with ulterior motives have already polluted the 
peoples’ minds with biased and inaccurate information. Outreach is not treated as a 
priority or integral to the transition’s success. Implementers consistently under prioritize 
outreach and fail to treat it as an indispensable part of transitional justice. The 
understaffing and underfunding that follows the lack of prioritizations leaves outreach 
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programs ill-equipped to manage language issues, travel expenses, and the other complex 
logistics associated with a successful program. 
Global health campaigns view social mobilization as a main component of 
success. It is included as a core component of their strategy and successes in global health 
efforts are often attributed to a robust and relentless social mobilization effort. When 
crafting immunization campaigns, social mobilization is outlined as a main component. 
When faced with obstacles, they frequently use increased social engagement as a tool. 
Viewing it as a high priority ensures adequate funding, which they secure through multi-
year commitments to enable long-term planning. Furthermore, they form a complex and 
coherent strategy employing hundreds of people and reaching out to thousands in the 
communities they are working with. The increase in staffing makes them able to reach 
out to IDP’s, diasporas, and under-served communities. Their proactive approach and 
local connections provide better media relations and help them control the conversation, 
informing people why their work is important, safe, and why it should be trusted. 
Transitional justice operations would greatly benefit from incorporating social 
mobilization practices into their efforts. Social mobilization faces the same troubles of 
language, terrain, access, expenses, media, and poverty issues. Viewing outreach as an 
integral part of the transition’s success, and thereby making it a high priority, will enable 
the process to lay down roots much quicker in the communities they are entering. It will 
enable them to make better relations with the media to disseminate accurate and 
favorable information about their efforts. Offices will be staffed with qualified, 
experienced, and multilingual people to handle the onslaught of victims wanting to 




 Enabling transitional justice processes to take root in the affected communities 
and having them viewed as legitimate is the key to their success. The departure of violent 
regimes and the end to conflict leave nations without rule of law, good governance, 
accountability or any transparency about past atrocities. Tackling these problems quickly 
and effectively to bring a sense of reconciliation and retribution amongst the affected 
populations is imperative. Using judicial and non-judicial options when conducting 
transitional justice is an option many countries and the international community have 
used in the past. Communities hold trials or tribunals to hold wrongdoers accountable and 
use truth commissions to unearth decades of violence and suppression. Moreover, 
granting amnesties to some bad actors or putting limitations on political parties for 
participating in the new government can help put both victims and low-level perpetrators 
at ease and more willing to reconcile their differences.  
 Ensuring this process is viewed as legitimate requires years of work, millions of 
dollars, and relentless efforts. When used correctly, conducting outreach programs to 
inform victims of what the transition seeks to accomplish helps ground the process. 
Outreach programs can range from town-hall style forums, news coverage, radio 
programs, disseminating pamphlets, transporting victims from their homes to 
proceedings, to one on one conversation. A lack of outreach leaves people misinformed 
and less willing to participate or trust the process.  
 Global health campaigns, facing many of the same challenges, have risen above 
them and worked to eradicate many diseases from the world’s most remote areas. They 
employ a robust and long-term social mobilization campaign. Campaigns closely tie the 
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success of their campaigns to the success of their mobilization efforts. They build trust 
in-country from the federal level all the way down to the individual citizen by engaging 
local influencers, journalists, tribal elders and religious leaders. The extensive efforts 
allow them to tackle issues of cost, logistics, language, and access to underserved 
populations. Bringing over best practices from global health campaigns and applying 
them to transitional justice is a viable solution worth exploring to aid in the irreplaceable 




















This thesis showed how mistrust between local populations and transitional 
justice’s implementers serves as a major obstacle as countries transition between 
governments, leaving a violent non-democratic regime behind, and hopefully moving 
towards democratization. The thesis defines transitional justice as a set of judicial or non-
judicial tools used to both reconcile a conflicted population while holding bad actors 
accountable. It identifies the three main areas as mistrust as trust between the local 
populations, the role of political elites, and the lack of social mobilization. 
The first chapter demonstrates the influence political elites have in the transition. 
The chapter explains how political elites have an interest in influencing regime change 
and any transitions that occur afterwards. Additionally, the chapter shows how political 
elites can manipulate transitions to further their own financial or political goals. The 
second chapter showed how both judicial and non-judicial transitional justice methods 
present pitfalls and can be ill-perceived by the people they are intended to help. The 
chapter uses several judicial and non-judicial examples and provides a plethora of 
instances where methods adversely affected their target audience and created mistrust 
between already tense populations and the transition’s implementers.  The final chapter 
stresses the importance of outreach efforts and shows how the outreach efforts contribute 
to a successful transition. Unfortunately, despite the success of outreach efforts, they are 
consistently underutilized. Conducting outreach operations requires overcoming several 
obstacles, which implementers are frequently unable to overcome. The paper compares 
transitional justice’s lackluster outreach efforts to global health’s robust outreach 
campaigns and provides a model for best practices moving forward.  
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The important goals of transitional justice will not be met until the local 
population views the process as legitimate. Many experts agree that implementing 
transitional justice can promote democratization and reconcile societies after they have 
been subjected to gross human rights violations. The Nuremberg Trials stand the test of 
time as a way to hold high-ranking Nazi officials accountable. Since then, similar trials 
have been conducted all over the world. However, the international community’s 
inability to prioritize legitimacy enough to research and develop best practices has 
severely undercut the process and tampered its effectiveness.  
Understanding which methods to use will help create a good foundation when the 
transition begins. Both judicial and non-judicial methods can be misinterpreted as victor’s 
justice or one-sided. Understanding political elites and their motives will help 
implementers create proper incentive structures, encouraging behavior that is focused on 
a successful transition versus a power grab. Domestic elites can base their 
implementation on how their constituency views it, instead of convincing their 
constituency of the transition’s importance. In the past, countries and organizations tied 
aid and international acceptance to implementation. This caused elites to tailor their 
response to the proceedings based on international relations versus the need to promote 
reconciliation. In the end, these actions have to be buttressed by strong outreach 
campaigns that inform the public, get them invested in the process’s success, and 
encourage them to participate and promote reconciliation. 
As demonstrated above, transitional justice proceedings can easily be 
delegitimized, but their success is imperative for democratization. Metrics to understand 
best practices will be critical moving forward. There is insufficient research regarding 
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cost breakdowns of the different methods, making it difficult to identify where money is 
being spent and how better to allocate it in the future. Further research should be directed 
at establishing best practices on creating and maintaining trust between the implementers 
and the community. 
This paper argued how important legitimacy is to the success of implementing 
transitional justice, and, how the United States, international organizations, and NGO’s 
all have a vested interest in improving the process. It showed how failing to quell ethnic 
cleavages leads to further conflict endangering American soldiers and costing billions of 
dollars. Transitional justice has the potential to heal struggling societies, save lives, and 
prevent post-conflict societies from devolving into more conflict. Understanding how to 
accomplish this successfully is a pertinent and timely issue, since conflicts and 
revolutions have arisen throughout Northern Africa, the Middle East and tension is 
growing in South Asia. It is vital that best practices and strong implementation strategies 
are crafted sooner rather than later. The need for reconciliation and retribution amongst 
warring societies will not be diminishing anytime in the near future, and current practices 
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